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EDITORIAL 
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In the past months the perception of integrity of 
the euro area has improved substantially. 
Predictions of a disintegration of the euro area, 
which were rife a year ago, have been proven 
wrong and we now face an altogether more 
stable perspective. The challenge going forward 
now consists of complementing the measures 
taken so far in fighting the crisis with action for 
completing Economic and Monetary Union. 
A stepwise realisation of a deeper and genuine 
EMU is required in order to resolve the 
incompleteness and potential instability of the 
EMU's original design. The current stagnation in 
economic activity is also a reflection of the 
aggravation of the sovereign debt crisis caused 
by confidence losses. The partly self-fulfilling 
ebb of credit from vulnerable countries can only 
be reversed if market fears of a fundamental 
fracture within the euro area are allayed. 
Research presented in this edition of the 
Quarterly Report confirms that a significant part 
of the surge in sovereign spreads in vulnerable 
countries cannot be explained by fundamental 
factors alone but also reflects an increase in 
uncertainty surrounding the stability of EMU.  
Significant progress has been made in recent 
weeks and months to formulate the requirements 
for a coherent and dependable framework for an 
'EMU 2.0'. A complete vision for a deep and 
genuine EMU is developed in the Blueprint 
published by the Commission on 28 November. 
It aims to rectify the shortcomings of EMU's 
original setup by proposing essential actions 
necessary in the short, medium and long term so 
that stability and prosperity become a lasting 
feature of EMU. In the short term, it suggests 
that immediate priority should be given to the 
full deployment of the new economic 
governance tools under the six-pack and two-
pack regulations, as well as the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the banking 
field. Proposals will also be made for a Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which will be in 
charge of the restructuring and resolution of 
banks of the Member States participating in the 
Banking Union. The Blueprint also proposes the 
creation of a common financial instrument 
through which economic reform plans agreed in 
advance between Member States and the 
Commission can be supported.  
In the medium term, it suggests closer economic 
and budgetary policy integration, notably by 
developing a dedicated fiscal capacity for the 
euro area, as well as by establishing a debt 
redemption fund and the common issuance of 
eurobills. In the longer term, a Banking Union 
should be completed and a common fiscal 
capacity could gain in power so as to help 
stabilise and smooth the adverse impact of 
asymmetric shocks within the euro area. This 
vision for a deep and genuine EMU is the 
Commission's input into the ongoing process of 
redesigning EMU and, in particular, into the 
final 'Four Presidents Report' which was 
published on 5 December.  
Rebuilding confidence in the euro area also 
means addressing specific challenges at the 
Member State level. In the prominent case of 
Greece, the Eurogroup of 13 December formally 
approved the second disbursement under the 
second adjustment programme, following the 
finalisation of the relevant national procedures 
and after having reviewed the outcome of the 
debt buy back operation conducted by Greece. 
This, together with the initiatives agreed by the 
Eurogroup on 27 November and full 
implementation of the adjustment programme, 
should bring Greece's public debt back on a 
sustainable path, to 124% of GDP in 2020. On 
that basis, Member States have authorised the 
EFSF to release the next programme instalment 
for a total amount of EUR 49.1 billion. 
Early action on a key building block of a new 
EMU framework has come from the 
Commission in the form of its September 
proposals for a Banking Union. If we are to 
break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns and reconstruct an integrated 
financial system in the euro area that is robust 
enough to deal with the challenges of large 
cross-border markets, a Banking Union is key.  
In December, EU finance ministers made an 
important step in that direction by agreeing on 
the SSM. When an effective supervisory 
mechanism is established, the European Stability 
Mechanism will have the possibility to 
recapitalise banks directly. December's European 
Council added further political momentum to the 
Banking Union by asking the Commission to 
submit, in the course of 2013, a proposal for a 
single resolution mechanism.  
Swift move towards Banking Union is essential 
to overcome the financial fragmentation seen 
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over the course of the year. Fragmentation not 
only poses a risk for financial stability in 
affected economies, it also undermines the very 
goal of open and integrated financial markets in 
Europe. Overcoming financial fragmentation is 
key to ensuring a proper allocation of savings. 
When combined with fundamental reforms of 
EMU's functioning, renewed financial 
integration will lead to falling spreads and much 
more supportive monetary and financial 
conditions in vulnerable countries. 
I see two further main challenges for economic 
policy in the year ahead. First, ensuring fiscal 
sustainability continues to be testing but also 
necessary. Over the course of 2012 government 
debt as a share of GDP was still on an increasing 
path in every single euro area Member State, and 
only from 2013 onwards are the first Member 
States expected to see declining debt trajectories. 
When further considering that public debt in the 
euro area has risen from 70% in 2008 to 90% in 
mid-2012, one realises that the tide of adverse 
fiscal dynamics is hard to turn. As argued in our 
latest Fiscal Sustainability Report, short-term 
risks of fiscal stress have decreased since 2009 
but long-term challenges due to the legacy of the 
crisis and an ageing population remain 
significant.  
It is true that, in the current downturn, the 
adverse impact of consolidation on economic 
activity may be larger than usual. But business is 
no longer 'as usual' – the last months and years 
have shown us how easily market access can be 
lost, and how hard it is to maintain financial 
stability when confidence collapses. I would 
argue that this bleak scenario is the alternative 
that would await us if we do not take 
consolidation needs seriously.  
Of course budgetary consolidation should be as 
growth-friendly as possible. As argued in our 
report on the "Quality of public expenditure in 
the EU", there is a need to make sure that 
consolidation does not undermine expenditure in 
growth-friendly items such as education, R&D 
and human capital investment and that it takes 
advantage of available scope for efficiency 
gains. Consolidation should also take into 
account evolving economic conditions. This is 
precisely what the EU's reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) does. Each Member State's 
consolidation effort is specified in structural 
terms and takes into account the country's fiscal 
space and macroeconomic conditions. 
Accordingly, if macroeconomic circumstances 
call for it, a Member State may receive extra 
time to correct its excessive deficit when growth 
conditions deteriorate. This has been the case in 
Spain, Portugal and Greece this year.  
A second major challenge lies in ensuring a 
continued and lasting unwinding of the 
macroeconomic imbalances that built up in the 
pre-crisis decade. As the Commission's Autumn 
Forecast of November makes clear, much of the 
recent economic weakness is also a reflection of 
the deep ongoing adjustment of external and 
internal imbalances and 2013 will be a year of 
little growth in the euro area.  
But progress with imbalances is becoming 
tangible. Competitiveness is being regained 
where it was lost over the last decade, and labour 
markets and industrial landscapes are reordering 
and reforming where unsustainable boom 
periods skewed the economy's entire structure. 
We are also seeing clear reduction in current 
account imbalances, which have fallen 
considerably in countries with high former 
deficits. Some surplus countries are also 
supporting the adjustment. Their surplus with 
vulnerable countries is falling substantially at the 
same time as their trade balance with non-euro 
area countries is improving. This shows that 
euro area rebalancing need not come at the cost 
of overall competitiveness. A recent 
Commission study provides further in-depth 
analysis on the role of surplus countries in the 
rebalancing process. 
Tackling the challenges of an improved EMU 
framework, fiscal sustainability and the 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances will 
ultimately allow the conditions for sustainable 
long-term growth to be established. Close 
macro-financial surveillance and economic 
policy coordination are the leading tools for 
working towards these long-term goals. If in 
future these tools can be fitted into a more robust 
EMU framework, the crisis of confidence that 
has caused market panic and fragmentation in 
the euro area can be overcome.  
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR - GENERAL 
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I.1. Introduction 
Developments in housing markets can have 
widespread macroeconomic effects on economic 
activity, the functioning of the labour market, 
macro-financial stability and general welfare 
(including redistribution of resources within and 
across generations, or exposure of citizens to 
credit and market risk). Moreover, inappropriate 
institutional, regulatory and fiscal settings in 
housing can foster macro-financial risks and 
vulnerabilities in the banking sector and 
inefficient allocation of resources, crowding out 
tradable sectors. 
Against this background, a key challenge for 
policy makers in the euro area is to identify 
unsustainable developments in house prices 
(boom-bust episodes) early on. Assessing those 
imbalances and their associated risks is, however, 
technically challenging and multiple dimensions 
need to be taken on board, reflecting 
heterogeneous institutional frameworks in 
mortgage and housing markets across Member 
States as well as dissimilar macroeconomic 
conditions. 
The objective of this focus section is to present an 
attempt at building a comprehensive approach to 
gauging the dynamics and sustainability of house 
price developments in the euro area. The analysis 
provides an overall assessment of the degree of 
imbalances at Member State level. 
Identifying unsustainable developments in house 
prices is not a straightforward task. A range of 
methods can be used, from simple descriptive 
statistics to more complex econometric modelling 
approaches. No method is exempt from 
limitations and should therefore be used in 
isolation. 
In order to cover all the relevant dimensions and 
compensate for the limitations of individual 
methodologies, the analysis presented in this 
section is based on an encompassing approach, a 
housing imbalance toolkit which combines: 
• A house price cycle analysis, which identifies 
booms and busts as episodes of 
protracted/sharp movements in house prices 
away from their trend. It also relates house 
price dynamics to developments in 
macroeconomic conditions. 
• Confirmation signals from valuation 
methods. The identification of unsustainable 
housing developments can benefit from 
confirming signals based on: (i) indicators of 
affordability and rental ratios and 
(ii) econometric estimations of house prices, 
considering housing as a consumption good 
and relating prices to housing demand 
(income, demographic pressures, credit 
developments, etc.) and/or supply (existing 
stock of housing, building permits, unsold 
houses, land availability or construction costs, 
etc.) factors. 
Sections 2 and 3 describe these two approaches in 
some detail. Section 4 presents an overall 
assessment of housing imbalances derived from 
This focus section presents a housing market imbalance ‘toolkit’ to identify unsustainable housing market 
developments early on. It combines a house price cycle analysis and a range of valuation methods. The house 
price cycle analysis identifies over- or under-valuation of house prices by comparing actual prices with an 
estimated filtered trend, and then detecting local peaks and troughs. Unsustainable developments (boom/bust 
episodes) are separated from milder cyclical ups (bull phase) and downs (bear phase) by looking at their 
amplitude and duration (and severity as a combination of both dimensions). As a result, Member States can be 
grouped according to any unsustainable developments identified in the last upswing as those with: (i) long and 
ample booms, (ii) sudden and sharp booming periods, (iii) long and mild developments above the trend, with 
lower average house price growth rates and, (iv) no identified booming episodes. The outcome of the cyclical 
analysis is supplemented with valuation methods to obtain confirmation signals coming from affordability and 
price-to-rental ratios as well as equilibrium house price estimates based on economic fundamentals, such as 
total population, real disposable income and long-term interest rates. None of the methods used is exempt from 
caveats and technical challenges but the combination of all the relevant dimensions allows a comprehensive 
approach. 
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the use of this toolkit and concludes by sketching 
out the way forward. 
I.2. The housing imbalance toolkit: a 
house price cycle analysis 
General principles 
Following Agnello and Schuknecht (2009), (1) the 
analysis of house price cycles rests on Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) detrending techniques. This makes 
it possible to extract the cyclical component of 
house prices, namely the house price gap (i.e. the 
actual price minus the trend). Indicators of the 
severity of house price cycles are computed on the 
basis of the magnitude and duration of the 
different phases of the housing cycle. More 
specifically, severity in the dynamics of house 
prices over the cycle is estimated via a multi-step 
approach (see Graph I.1 for an example): 
• Relative (or deflated) housing prices are 
detrended and troughs and peaks are identified 
for the resulting house price gap. 
• The duration (D) and cumulated change or 
amplitude (A) are computed over the different 
trough-peak and peak-trough phases. 
• The severity (S) of the bull/bear phases is then 
estimated by the area of a triangle with base 
given by the duration and height given by the 
amplitude (S = (A× D) / 2). 
• The main data source is the Experimental 
House Price Index built by Eurostat and 
supplemented with ECB, OECD and BIS 
data. (2) The Eurostat index has a short time 
coverage (it goes back to only 2005) but is the 
only harmonised and thus consistently 
comparable indicator for euro area Member 
States. Overall, the data sample covers euro 
area countries from 1972Q2 to 2012Q2 
although the panel is very incomplete and just 
a handful of Member States present the total 
162 data points. 
                                                        
(1) Agnello, L., and L. Schuknecht (2009), ‘Booms and busts in 
housing markets: Determinants and implications’, ECB 
Working Paper, No 1071. 
(2) Eurostat (2010), ‘Experimental house price indices for the 
euro area and the European Union’, Research Paper, 
December 2010. 
Graph I.1: Relative house price gap, Spain 
(1972Q4-2012Q2) (1) 
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(1) The overvaluation or relative price gap is calculated as the 
difference between actual prices and their filtered trend. 
Source: Eurostat and DG ECFIN calculations. 
First step: estimating deviations from the trend 
House prices are decomposed into trend and cycle 
terms using the HP filter. The HP filter, although 
easy to interpret and in widespread use, has 
several well-known drawbacks. It poses problems 
at the end of the sample and the choice of the 
smoothing parameter (λ) substantially influences 
the outcomes. Moreover, the HP filter and its 
variants generally tend to overestimate the 
number of boom/bust episodes as they also detect 
short-lived developments. 
In order to minimise the end-point problem, 
ARIMA models are first fitted to the logs of the 
real house price series. The series are then 
extended with the forecasts given by the 
univariate models. Finally, the HP filter is applied 
in order to detrend real house prices and obtain 
the house price gap, calculated as the difference 
between actual prices and the trend. (3) 
Results are presented in Graph I.2. It can be noted 
that the peak of the last cycle took place around 
2008 for most countries. The analysis also 
suggests that only Germany is currently 
presenting a positive gap with respect to its trend, 
as relative house prices are growing again, after a 
protracted period of decline in the years preceding 
the crisis. In contrast, the adjustment taking place 
in most other countries since 2008 has driven their 
house price gaps into negative territory. 
                                                        
(3) The smoothing parameter is set to 100 000 as in Goodhart, C. 
and B. Hofmann (2008), ‘House prices, money, credit and the 
macroeconomy’, ECB Working Paper Series, No 888, and 
Agnello and Shuknecht (2009). 
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The results presented in the graph should not, 
however, be interpreted as evidence of price 
misalignments in the euro area. Countries 
experiencing housing adjustment episodes are 
now below their trend. The trend should not be 
interpreted as a floor, however. During a 
downswing, house prices naturally evolve below 
the trend without necessarily indicating significant 
misalignment. In contrast, prices in Germany 
present a positive gap. Prices are now 
experiencing an upward cyclical phase after 
reaching a trough in 2008. Continuous monitoring 
will be needed to determine whether and when 
this cyclical upward movement becomes 
unsustainable. 
Second step: identifying and analysing the 
house price cycle 
A classical NBER analysis is applied to detrended 
house price data, first detecting peaks and troughs 
with the Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm (4) 
and then discarding small fluctuations that cannot 
be considered as genuine cyclical 
developments. (5) Following this approach makes 
it possible to obtain information on the amplitude, 
duration and severity of the house price cycle for 
euro area countries. The phases of the cycle are 
presented in Table I.1. 
                                                        
(4) Bry, G. and C. Broschan (1971), ‘Cyclical analysis of time 
series: Selected procedures and computer programs’, UMI 
publisher. 
(5) Restrictions imposed to eliminate minor fluctuations include 
using a rolling window of 12 quarters of the price series, 
eliminating episodes with two consecutive peaks or troughs 
and imposing a change in the sign of the relative price gap 
(going from over- to under-valuation or vice versa) in order 
to confirm a change in the phase of the cycle. 
Graph I.2: Relative house price gap, selected euro area countries  
(in %, 1972Q2-2012Q2) (1) 
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(1) The overvaluation of relative price gap is calculated as the difference between actual prices and their filtered trend. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
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In addition, unsustainable boom-bust 
developments are separated from more moderate 
changes in house prices by applying restriction 
criteria to the severity indicator. These consist in 
either removing the first three quartiles of the 
distribution or allowing only fluctuations above a 
certain threshold (two standard deviations). Both 
methods produce relatively similar results, with 
the corresponding characteristics of the boom and 
bust episodes shown in the last two rows of 
Table I.1. (6) 
A first look at the data reveals some important 
features of the latest housing cycle in the euro 
area. 
First, average duration, amplitude and also 
severity are fairly symmetrical across the house 
price gap cycle. Indeed, bear periods tend to 
match bull periods. Bear episodes lasted on 
average 22 quarters, with a cumulated drop in 
relative prices from peak to trough of 31 pp 
(relative to trend) (7) while bull episodes lasted on 
average 26 quarters, with cumulated price gains of 
32 pp. Moreover, the latest upswing was longer 
and more exuberant than previous episodes, 
lasting on average 33 quarters, with an amplitude 
of 39 pp. Given the symmetry between bull and 
bear periods, the severity of bull periods may be 
used as a benchmark for assessing the required 
adjustment in the current bear period. When 
assessing the potential for further house price 
corrections, what matters is not the distance with 
respect to the trend (traditionally known as over- 
or under-valuation) but rather net severity, 
measured as the severity accumulated over the 
build-up phase minus its counterpart accumulated 
over the correction. 
Second, when gauged against the full sample, nine 
euro area Member States (IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, SI and EE) presented boom features over the 
last decade, according to at least one of the three 
cyclical indicators (amplitude, duration or 
severity). (8) The case for Ireland and Spain is 
clear-cut as they surpass the thresholds for the 
three cyclical indicators, presenting a long and 
ample upswing in house prices relative to trend 
                                                        
(6) Bull or bear periods during which at least one of the three 
cyclical indicators (amplitude, duration, severity) exceeds the 
average level found during boom or bust episodes are shaded 
in grey in the table. 
(7) As correction is ongoing in most Member States, bear figures 
might be slightly biased upwards. 
(8) Booms are defined as discussed previously, i.e. bull periods 
for which the severity indicator exceeds either the 3rd 
quartile of the distribution or 2 standard deviations, with both 
thresholds yielding similar results. 
that can be regarded as a boom. Both countries 
have experienced strong price corrections in 
recent years that can be classed as busts according 
to the metrics used here. Estonia and, to a lesser 
extent, Slovenia witnessed a short and sudden 
upswing, which was more than offset in 
cumulative terms in a short period of time since 
the peak. Lastly, France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Portugal witnessed long albeit more moderate 
deviations of prices from the trend. (9) Indeed, 
developments in their relative house prices are 
signalled as unsustainable due to the long duration 
of the upswing rather than to cumulated price 
change. Interestingly, these countries are among 
those which have not experienced sizeable 
corrections so far, suggesting that the amplitude 
criterion (i.e. cumulated price changes) might be a 
better proxy than the duration criterion for 
detecting price rises that are likely to turn into 
damaging busts. 
It is important to interpret these findings on house 
price cycles in the broader context of 
macroeconomic developments. Member States 
which followed strong bull house price dynamics 
over the past cycle, such as Ireland, Spain and to 
some extent Estonia and Slovenia, have all 
recently undergone a strong correction of their 
residential investment rates, while their economic 
activity was contracting. In these countries, the 
housing boom of the previous decade was 
associated with various degrees of external 
imbalances which have since been to some extent 
reversed. Moreover, a strong accumulation of 
household debt came hand-in-hand with housing 
imbalances. Rapid credit growth fuelled housing 
market activity, leaving households with a 
substantial debt overhang in several Member 
States. In the downturn, protracted deleveraging 
processes will most likely accompany house price 
adjustments. In 2012Q1 household deleveraging 
was already under way in countries such as 
Estonia, Ireland and Spain. 
By contrast, in Member States with a protracted 
but more moderate house price upswing, such as 
France, the Netherlands and Italy, the increase and 
subsequent correction in residential investment 
were more moderate. Household indebtedness has 
not receded after the onset of the global economic 
and financial crisis and current account dynamics 
have also been little affected by the crisis.  
                                                        
(9) Even more so for the Netherlands, where the 1989Q3 peak 
could be considered as local, with the latest bull phase 
starting already in 1985Q2. 
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I.3. The housing imbalance toolkit: 
confirmation signals from valuation 
methods 
In order to identify unsustainable developments in 
housing markets, house price cycle analysis can 
be supplemented with affordability (price-to-
income) and dividend (price-to-rental) ratios. 
These ratios can be compared to their long-term 
averages, with the gap between the latter and the 
actual value providing information on over- or 
under-valuation. 
Conclusions based on these indicators have to be 
considered with caution due to their simplifying 
assumptions. Comparisons with the long-term 
average are only valid for stationary series. 
However, traditional unit root tests point to non-
stationary properties of affordability and dividend 
ratios in many countries; see for example 
Caporale and Gil-Alana (2010). (10) Moreover, as 
pointed out in André (2010), (11) affordability 
ratios can be affected by changes in the 
distribution of income across age groups or 
changes in the average size of households, while 
rentals can be highly regulated, distorting the 
interpretation of price-to-rental ratios. 
                                                        
(10) Caporale, G.M. and L.A. Gil-Alana (2010), ‘US disposable 
personal income and housing price index: A fractional 
integration analysis’, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1070, 
DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. 
(11) André, C. (2010), ‘A bird’s eye view of OECD housing. 
markets,’ OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 
No 746, OECD Publishing. 
 
Table I.1: Identification of boom/bust episodes out of bull/bear cyclical developments  
In relative house price gaps, euro area (1) 
Country [Trough-Peak] Amplitude (% of trend)
Duration 
(quarters) Severity [Peak-Trough]
Amplitude 
(% of trend)
Duration 
(quarters) Severity
BE Q1 1973-Q3 1979 39.5 26 128.2 Q3 1979-Q3 1985 44.7 24 134.0
Q3 1985-Q2 1990 21.5 19 51.0 Q2 1990-Q4 2001 9.1 46 52.3
Q4 2001-Q2 2007 13.4 22 36.9 Q2 2007-Q2 2012 10.8 20 27.1
DE Q2 1976-Q2 1981 13.5 20 33.8 Q2 1981-Q1 1989 14.4 31 55.8
Q1 1989-Q4 1994 13.5 23 38.8 Q4 1994-Q1 2008 14.2 53 94.1
Q1 2008-Q2 2012 10.4 17 22.1
IE Q1 1978-Q4 1979 17.8 7 15.6 Q4 1979-Q4 1995 46.6 64 372.8
Q4 1995-Q1 2007 69.4 45 390.4 Q1 2007-Q2 2012 65.8 21 172.7
EL Q1 1997-Q1 2009 40.9 48 245.4 Q1 2009-Q2 2012 34.2 13 55.6
ES Q2 1972-Q2 1978 33.6 24 100.8 Q2 1978-Q4 1985 51.5 30 193.1
Q4 1985-Q1 1991 55.6 21 146.0 Q1 1991-Q4 2000 48.5 39 236.4
Q4 2000-Q3 2007 52.8 27 178.2 Q3 2007-Q2 2012 46.2 19 109.7
FR Q2 1972-Q4 1980 17.5 34 74.4 Q4 1980-Q1 1985 22.4 17 47.6
Q1 1985-Q1 1991 24 24 72.0 Q1 1991-Q3 1998 29.4 30 110.3
Q3 1998-Q1 2007 34.4 34 146.2 Q1 2007-Q2 2012 20.2 21 53.0
IT Q1 1980-Q2 1981 34.6 5 21.6 Q1 1975-Q1 1980 15.3 20 38.3
Q3 1986-Q3 1992 41.5 24 124.5 Q2 1981-Q3 1986 50.6 21 132.8
Q3 1998-Q4 2008 29.6 41 151.7 Q3 1992-Q3 1998 37.3 24 111.9
Q4 2008-Q2 2012 21.1 14 36.9
LU Q2 2000-Q4 2005 21.2 22 58.3 Q1 1995-Q2 2000 19.9 21 52.2
Q4 2005-Q3 2011 13.9 23 40.0
MT Q2 2002-Q1 2008 36.5 23 104.9 Q1 2000-Q2 2002 14.2 9 16.0
Q1 2008-Q2 2012 30.1 17 64.0
NL Q2 1972-Q2 1978 67.4 24 202.2 Q2 1978-Q2 1985 64.6 28 226.1
Q2 1985-Q3 1989 20.3 17 43.1 Q3 1989-Q2 1993 18.4 15 34.5
Q2 1993-Q4 2007 25 58 181.3 Q4 2007-Q2 2012 18.6 18 41.9
PT Q4 1996-Q1 2010 19.9 53 131.8 Q1 1995-Q4 1996 10.6 7 9.3
Q1 2010-Q2 2012 19.2 9 21.6
SI Q1 2003-Q4 2007 45 19 106.9 Q4 2007-Q2 2012 28.9 18 65.0
FI Q2 1979-Q3 1984 18.6 21 48.8 Q1 1974-Q2 1979 35.5 21 93.2
Q3 1986-Q2 1989 55.8 11 76.7 Q3 1984-Q3 1986 7.2 8 7.2
Q2 1993-Q4 1999 24.4 26 79.3 Q2 1989-Q2 1993 72.8 16 145.6
Q4 2001-Q1 2007 19.5 21 51.2 Q4 1999-Q4 2001 11 8 11.0
Q1 2009-Q3 2010 7.3 6 5.5 Q1 2007-Q1 2009 11.9 8 11.9
EE Q3 2003-Q2 2007 95.7 15 179.4 Q2 2007-Q3 2009 78.9 9 88.8
Q3 2009-Q2 2012 30.4 11 41.8
31.7 25 102.8 30.5 22 87.1
41.1 26 146.0 45.8 24 111.5
38.4 26 161.7 39.8 26 158.9
Bull phases Bear phases
Mean
Threshold (3rd quartile)
Threshold (2 std. dev.)  
(1) No analysis could be conducted for Cyprus, Austria and Slovakia due to the short data sample, starting in 2005Q1. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
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I.3.1. Affordability ratios 
Housing upswings need to be checked against 
affordability pressures for the average buyer. 
Indeed, an increase in households’ real disposable 
income can potentially accommodate rising house 
prices. On the other hand, prolonged and rapid 
increases in the price-to-disposable income ratio 
or even deviations from its long-term average 
could be interpreted as a sign of overvaluation. 
Construction of the series for the euro area 
Affordability ratios for the euro area are 
constructed, according to the OECD 
definition, (12) as the ratio of the nominal house 
price index to gross disposable income per 
capita. (13) This ratio is rebased to 100 in 2005, 
and therefore it cannot be compared across 
countries, but to each Member State’s long-term 
average. 
Graph I.3: Ratio of price to disposable income, 
euro area countries (2005=100) (1) 
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(1) Data for DE up to 1990 refer to West Germany. Sample max. 
and min. values are depicted by the blue bars. 
Source: AMECO, OECD, Eurostat, ECB, BIS. 
As shown in Graph I.3, Germany stands out with 
a current price-to-income ratio well below its 
long-term average and at a historical low. Estonia 
and Portugal also currently appear at very low 
levels. Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovenia are 
currently close to their long-term average, 
following their recent adjustments. These 
                                                        
(12) Girouard, N., M. Kennedy, P. Van den Noord and C. André 
(2006), ‘Recent house price developments: The role of 
fundamentals,’ OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No 475, OECD Publishing. 
(13) The house price index is calculated as in the previous section. 
For Bulgaria and Malta, GDP is used instead of gross 
disposable income per capita. 
countries could be regarded as subject to only 
limited downward pressures in house prices, 
according to the indicator. 
On the other hand, Belgium, Spain, France, 
Luxembourg and Malta currently present large 
deviations from their long-term benchmark, 
suggesting higher adjustment potential. Finland, 
Italy and Greece are also among those with a 
price-to-income ratio above the historical average, 
although in these countries the gap is smaller in 
relative terms and therefore the scope for 
correction seems lower (classed as medium 
pressures). 
Additional analysis using effort ratios 
Findings based on the price-to-income ratio have 
to be considered with caution due to their 
simplifying assumptions. There appears to be no 
cointegration relationship between house prices 
and disposable income in the long run, possibly 
due to time-varying mortgage costs (see Girouard 
et al. 2006). It is therefore useful to look at other 
affordability indicators, such as the interest 
burden, in combination with the total debt figures. 
As shown in Table I.2, indebtedness has reached 
record-high levels over the last cycle, leaving 
households with a large debt overhang. However, 
in most Member States this did not translate into a 
lower ability to service debt due to the prevailing 
low-interest environment. 
 
Table I.2: Household debt and interest burden 
against disposable income (in %) 
1995 2000 2007 2011 1995 2000 2007 2011
BE 54.3 62.6 79.8 85.2 BE 2.4 2.5 3.0 1.5
DE 89.7 108.0 92.1 88.4 DE 5.4 5.2 4.0 2.9
IE (1) n.a. 112.1 201.7 202.5 IE (1) n.a. 4.9 8.1 3.1
EL n.a. 50.2 71.1 84.6 EL n.a. 0.2 2.3 2.7
ES n.a. 69.1 127.7 123.6 ES n.a. 2.3 5.3 3.0
FR 51.5 54.2 74.7 82.9 FR 3.1 2.2 3.6 2.0
IT 24.3 34.0 58.3 65.4 IT 2.1 1.0 2.2 0.8
CY (2) 95.9 115.7 154.9 173.0 CY (2) 5.9 7.3 4.4 5.1
LU n.a. n.a. 126.7 132.2 LU n.a. n.a. 5.9 2.5
NL n.a. 163.7 249.8 266.0 NL n.a. 9.2 11.7 6.5
AT (2) 106.0 73.7 86.7 90.5 AT (2) 6.9 2.4 2.8 1.6
PT 63.1 84.5 127.8 125.6 PT 2.2 2.6 8.0 2.9
SI (2) 35.4 0.0 42.0 47.2 SI (2) 4.9 1.7 2.2 1.4
SK (2) 0.0 9.5 47.9 56.1 SK (2) 1.3 0.7 2.1 1.1
FI 8.5 61.2 98.1 103.5 FI 1.0 2.6 4.7 1.6
Household debt to disposable 
income (%)
Interest burden to disposable income 
(%)
 
(1) 2002 first data available. (2) 2010 latest annual data 
available. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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In absolute levels, the Netherlands stands out as 
presenting the highest interest burden. This 
feature represents undoubtedly a manifestation of 
its particular institutional features in mortgage 
markets (and related tax arrangements), (14) but 
nevertheless points towards additional risks in the 
event of increases in interest rates. The interest 
burden has recently increased in Greece: although 
still low in relative terms, it could continue to rise 
as the disposable income prospects are poor. In 
contrast, Belgium, France and Italy have benefited 
from a low interest rate environment. This 
reduced interest burden alleviates somewhat their 
affordability analysis. 
I.3.2. Price-to-rental ratios 
Housing prices can also be assessed against the 
cost of renting. Following the asset price 
modelling literature, house price changes are 
expected to be driven by changes in expected 
capital gains or in future housing services (rental 
yields). In equilibrium, agents should be 
indifferent between buying/selling and renting. 
Thus, movements in the price-to-rental ratio could 
be interpreted as a sign of overheating (higher 
ratio) or cooling (lower ratio) markets. When 
prices gain ground relative to rentals, there will be 
downward pressures on the former through lower 
demand, and vice versa. 
Construction of the series for the euro area 
Price-to-rental ratios are constructed, using the 
OECD definition, as the nominal house price 
index divided by the rental component of the 
consumer price index. (15) 
In broad terms, the price-to-rental ratio shows a 
significant increase in the cost of owning versus 
the cost of renting in the last 10 years for most 
Member States, pointing to the existence of 
imbalances in the housing sector (Graph I.4). 
More specifically, Belgium, Spain, France, 
Luxembourg, Malta and Finland represent 
examples of high potential for correction, given 
that their current index is well above its long-term 
                                                        
(14) The combination of a relatively large share of variable 
interest rate mortgages and high interest rate deductibility 
yields a substantial gap between gross and net (after-tax) 
servicing costs for Dutch households. 
(15) The house price index is derived from Eurostat’s 
Experimental House Price Index combined with other 
sources. The rental component of consumer price index is 
derived from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database, 
except for Malta, where Eurostat data are used. 
average. The opposite appears to be the case in 
Germany, Ireland, Portugal and Estonia, which 
are subject to low pressures according to the 
price-to-rental ratio. Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Slovenia could be regarded as in-
between cases as their current level stands above 
but close to the benchmark. 
Graph I.4: Price-to-rental index, 
euro area countries (2005=100) (1) 
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(1) Sample max. and min. values are depicted by the blue bars. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, ECB, BIS. 
This simple descriptive analysis suffers, however, 
from an important drawback. As in the case of the 
affordability ratios, taking the long-term average 
as a benchmark equilibrium value assumes 
stationarity, which contradicts the empirical 
evidence in many cases. (16) 
Additional analysis using imputed rents 
In order to overcome these caveats, theoretical 
ways of estimating equilibrium prices can be 
introduced. The user cost of owning a house, 
known as the imputed rent, is a function of a 
number of components that include mortgage 
payments, forgone interest that the owner would 
have earned by investing in something other than 
the house (opportunity cost) and various other 
costs such as taxes and maintenance costs. These 
costs are offset by a number of benefits that 
accrue through owning a house, such as possible 
tax deductibility and expected capital gains. 
Graph I.5 presents the gap between actual house 
prices and the estimated equilibrium values using 
the method of imputed rents. A high value for the 
gap reflects potential overvaluations in the  
                                                        
(16) See Krainer, J. and C. Wei (2004), ‘House prices and 
fundamental value’, FRBSF Economic Letter 2004-27. 
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Box I.1: Deriving equilibrium house prices
A Theoretical approach (following Bolt et al. 2011) 
The imputed rent Ht, i.e. the user cost of owning a house, is a function of a number of parameters (Himmelberg et al. 
2005) (1), for example: 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − (𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡),  
where  Pt is the price of the house, mt is the mortgage rate and hence  mt Pt is the mortgage the owner has to pay, φt is 
a factor that captures costs that the owner incurs (such as maintenance costs) and δEtPt+1-Pt is the expected capital 
gain, with (1-δ) the physical depreciation of the house. Note that this is a simplified version of the factors affecting 
imputed rents as described in the main text. Re-arranging this in terms of the house price, we have: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡   
where Rt=1+mt+φ. Assuming rational expectations we can iterate forward and replace the forward-looking price with 
its infinite sum, i.e. 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �� 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡+1∏ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=0∞𝑖𝑖=0 �.  
In equilibrium, and following the no-arbitrage condition, agents should be indifferent between buying and renting. 
This implies that in equilibrium the cost of owning and using a house is the same as the cost of renting one and 
imputed rents equal actual rents. We can replace one for the other in the equation above to obtain an explicit form for 
equilibrium prices: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �� 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡+1∏ 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=0∞𝑖𝑖=0 �.  
Linearising the equations (following Hott and Monnin 2008) (2) 
We need to linearise the price equation in order to transform it into a linear function of stationary variables. We 
define Xt=Pt/Ht as the price to imputed rent ratio. We can then rewrite the price equation as: 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡+1/𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡) + 1𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 .  
After linearising through first-order Taylor expansion, iterating forward and taking conditional expectations, we 
substitute imputed rents with actual rents through the arbitrage condition, arriving at an equilibrium equation that can 
be estimated: 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = �𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �Δ𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖 − 1𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖� − 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐,∞
𝑖𝑖=1   
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡   
Estimation 
Consider the following VAR specification zt=Azt-1+ut-1,where zt is the vector of observables and A a set of estimated 
coefficients. Variable ut is a set of iid errors. Estimating this VAR allows us to forecast the future values of  zt. 
For the equilibrium model discussed so far the relevant vector is: 
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 = [𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡   Δ𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡    𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 … 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘   Δ𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘    𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ].  
We can therefore re-write the equilibrium price to imputed rent ratio as 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = �𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖) + 𝑔𝑔2𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+𝑐𝑐∞
𝑖𝑖=1 ,  
where g1=[0 1 -1/ρ 0…0]' and g2=[0 0 -1 0…0]'. Once we have the fitted values for the equilibrium price to imputed 
rent ratio, we can back out the equilibrium prices. 
 
(estimation routine provided by Marco van der Leij, University of Amsterdam, gratefully acknowledged) 
                                                          
(1) Himmelberg, C., C. Mayer and T. Sinai (2005), Assessing high house prices: Bubbles, fundamentals and misperceptions, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4),  
pp. 64-92. 
(2) Hott C. and P. Monnin (2008), Fundamental real estate prices: An empirical estimation with international data, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 
Springer 36(4), pp. 427–450  
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housing market. In qualitative terms, figures are 
roughly in line with the information reflected in 
Graph I.4, although current overvaluation seems 
more contained when compared to equilibrium 
levels instead of long-term averages. Moreover, 
looking at the almost negligible long-term average 
of the estimated gap, these series could be thought 
of as stationary, presenting mean-reverting 
properties. 
Graph I.5: House price valuation gap  
based on imputed rents, selected  
euro area economies (%) (1) 
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(1) Current date is 2011 Q4 and the starting point differs across 
countries: BE 1976Q4, IE 1987Q1, ES 1981Q1, FR 1973Q3, NL 
1974Q2, FI 1980Q3, DK 1981Q1, SE 1980Q2, UK 1973Q3. 
Sample max. and min. values are depicted by the blue bars. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
Belgium, Spain and France show the highest 
overvaluation figures and thus the biggest 
potential for correction according to this 
methodology. In the same manner, the adjustment 
witnessed so far in Ireland closed the gap, while 
more is to be expected in Spain and the 
Netherlands. Finland is above but close to the 
long-term average. 
Two important caveats apply to this interpretation 
of upcoming price adjustments. On the one hand, 
it implies that all the correction will take place 
through actual prices, with equilibrium prices held 
constant. Obviously, this is not necessarily the 
case as large shifts in equilibrium prices also 
occur, especially during periods of economic 
stress, and therefore the necessary adjustment may 
turn out to be larger than the overvaluation 
gap. (17) On the other hand, a protracted period of 
                                                        
(17) The fact that the estimated equilibrium price is not constant 
needs to be taken into account. Spain is a natural example 
where, despite strong adjustment in the housing market, the 
gap has been almost unchanged due to falling estimated 
equilibrium prices. 
undervalued prices generally follows booming 
episodes. Therefore, prices could go beyond 
closure of the gap. The absence of long time 
series makes it difficult to estimate equilibrium 
prices for most of the euro area Member States. 
I.3.3. House prices and market 
fundamentals 
The aim of this section is to provide estimates of 
the deviations of house prices from equilibrium 
values justified by fundamentals. The empirical 
literature is based on various methods of 
estimation of the effects of supply and demand 
factors on housing and mortgage markets. These 
include simple time series methods, single-
country multivariate approaches (structural vector 
auto-regressive models (VAR) or vector error 
correction models (VECM)), (18) multi-country 
panel approaches, or a combination of the latter 
two (panel VECM or VAR). (19) 
VAR- and VECM-based models can take into 
account the dynamic interplay between house 
prices, disposable income, demographic 
developments, housing investment, and credit 
conditions. In addition, VECM models can 
distinguish between short-term and long-term 
variations of real house prices in response to 
changes in other variables. In this setting, house 
prices can be assessed by comparing the actual 
prices to estimated fundamental values. 
Miles and Pillonca (2008) (20) decompose house 
price changes into their main driving factors. 
They identify as the main demand shifters real 
disposable income, real interest rates and 
demographics, while changes in the housing stock 
are generally taken as a proxy for the impact of 
the supply side. According to the authors, changes 
in income per capita and real interest rates explain 
around 40 % of house price changes on average. 
Population growth and particularly immigration 
flows provided an important spur to house prices 
in Ireland, Spain and the United States in pre-
crisis years. In some countries, the increase in 
                                                        
(18) See Girouard et al. (2006) for a literature survey, updated by 
Borowiecki (2008), ‘A macro view of the Swiss real estate 
market: an empirical study of the housing economy’, 
Diploma thesis at the Swiss Banking Institute at the 
University of Zürich. 
(19) See Goodhart, C. and B. Hofmann (2007), ‘House prices and 
the macroeconomy: Implications for banking and price 
stability’, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
(20) Miles, D. and V. Pilonca (2008), ‘Financial innovation and 
European housing and markets’, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 24. No 1, 2008, pp. 145-175. 
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house prices came hand-in-hand with rapid 
developments in residential investment, leading to 
an increase in the housing stock. This provided at 
least some counterweight to the demand increase, 
especially in Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. 
Finally, the authors identify a residual factor 
related to the prospects of future capital gains. 
The general feeling that house prices would rise 
indefinitely was fuelling demand through a drop 
in the expected user costs of owning a house, and 
relaxing to some extent the restrictions to 
accessing the mortgage market faced by 
households due to the collateral role of houses. 
Along these lines, André (2010) provides a 
detailed classification of mortgage market 
developments that also contributed to real house 
price increases during the years preceding the 
crisis: the extension of loan terms, an increase in 
the share of flexible-interest vs fixed loans, 
increased loan-to-value ratios, developments of 
housing equity withdrawal and development of 
subprime loans with their securitisation schemes, 
among others. Finally, country-specific factors, 
such as demand by non-residents for seasonal 
occupation, were especially relevant for 
Mediterranean countries such as Spain and 
France. 
It appears from these studies that the separation of 
house price shifters into fundamental and non-
fundamental variables is a complex task. Indeed, 
structural changes in the mortgage and house 
markets (e.g. increased average LTV, longer 
mortgage maturity, tax incentives) may lead to 
changes in housing demand, and therefore push 
the equilibrium house price upwards. However, if 
these structural changes turn out to be 
unsustainable, the equilibrium house prices may 
also need to revert to past levels. 
In order to estimate the equilibrium values for 
house prices justified by fundamentals, a VECM 
system has been designed building on a previous 
Graph I.6: Pooled estimate of long-run equilibrium house prices (1) 
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(1) Equilibrium house prices are derived from equations relating house pries to their fundamental (see text).   
Source: DG ECFIN. 
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study by ZEW. (21) The authors construct for a 
panel of 14 advanced economies four VECM 
models, each using a system of four fundamental 
variables, the real house price being in all cases 
one of them. The other variables are chosen from 
among: total population, urban population share, 
real housing investment, real disposable income 
per capita, real short-term interest rate and real 
long-term interest rate. (22) The authors show that 
these variables tend to follow integrated processes 
and that there is a cointegrating relationship 
among them. 
Following the same approach, a four-variable 
system of the real house price, the total 
population, the real disposable income per capita 
and the long-term interest rate is estimated for the 
period 1972-2011 on pooled data with country 
fixed effects. (23) The house prices and the 
estimates of the long-run equilibrium are 
presented in Graph I.6. 
A house price adjustment is under way in 
countries that were identified previously as 
following strong bull/bear dynamics. Fundamental 
trend house prices are retreating as disposable 
income and interest rates adjust in Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, and similar developments are to be 
expected in Spain and Slovenia. In countries 
where current prices are above or at the currently 
declining trend (Greece, Spain, Slovenia) house 
price pressures seem rather high. House prices are 
well below their long-term trend in Ireland and, to 
a lesser extent, in Portugal: medium to high future 
price pressures are expected as fundamentals 
continue to adjust. 
According to the overvaluation estimates, 
adjustment seems to be at an earlier stage in the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Malta and Italy. The 
adjustment of prices in France was short-lived and 
the estimated overvaluation gap has increased 
recently. All these countries could experience 
moderate downward pressures in the near future. 
Estonia had a strong adjustment below trend in 
the early stages of the crisis and house prices 
started to increase recently. Future upward 
                                                        
(21) ZEW (2011), ‘Housing markets and intra-euro area 
macroeconomic imbalances: Identifying policy instruments’, 
Unpublished study for the European Commission. 
(22) The modelling approach builds on Gattini and Hiebert 
(2010), ‘Forecasting and assessing euro area house prices 
through the lens of key fundamentals’, European Central 
Bank Working Papers Series, No 1249, October. 
(23) Germany and Austria are excluded due to specific housing 
market dynamics; Cyprus is excluded for reasons of data 
availability. 
developments warrant close surveillance. Lower 
price pressures are currently estimated for 
Finland, Luxembourg and Slovakia. 
These results should, however, be interpreted with 
caution as they are subject to considerable 
estimation caveats. First, identifying the effects of 
fundamentals on equilibrium prices is 
challenging. Moreover, it is important to bear in 
mind that in an overheating environment some 
fundamental determinants could be overshooting 
their long-term sustainable values. Possible 
developments in fundamentals that affect the 
long-term trend also need to be taken into account 
(e.g. currently Spain or Slovenia). Identification 
problems in the pooled fixed-effect estimation are 
severe for Member States with limited available 
data series, or where housing markets have been 
subject to significant structural changes during 
recent years. 
I.4. Overall assessment 
The identification of unsustainable developments 
in house prices is surrounded by a high degree of 
uncertainty, affecting researchers’ and policy 
makers’ capacity to foresee the timing and extent 
of house price cycles. No methodology is exempt 
from caveats and technical challenges. The 
combination of the relevant dimensions presented 
in this paper nevertheless permits a 
comprehensive approach helping, on the one 
hand, to identify booms followed by busts and, on 
the other hand, to assess the dynamics of 
undergoing adjustment processes. 
The identification of unsustainable developments 
requires confirming signals from the different 
methods. At this stage one of the main challenges 
remains pooling the information and the results 
coming from the various tools. The crossing of the 
cyclical identification of a boom with a 
confirming signal from any (or several) of the 
other overvaluation methods might be a way 
forward, as suggested in Dreger and 
Kholodilin (2011). (24) The dynamics of the 
ongoing correction phase in most housing markets 
in the euro area can also be proxied through the 
proposed toolkit. First, as stated above, severity 
indicators in the boom give a first-hand 
quantification of the extent of the required 
adjustment, in terms of both duration and 
amplitude. Second, VECM models might help 
forecast developments in house prices conditional 
on the evolution of their determinants. 
                                                        
(24) Dreger and Kholodilin (2011). 
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All in all, comparative cross-country analysis 
covering the main relevant dimensions gives an 
insight into housing market imbalances and 
provides a first approximation to existing 
divergences between euro area countries. 
Table I.3 presents an overview of the housing 
market pressures as signalled by the different 
methods. 
 
Table I.3: Overall downward pressures (1) 
IE Low + Low = Medium +
ES High = High = High =
SI Low = Medium na High -
EE Low (2) + Low na Low =
EL Medium + Medium na High =
FR High - High = Medium =
IT Medium - Medium na Medium =
NL Low + Medium = Medium =
PT Low + Low na Medium +
LU High = High na Low =
MT High = High na Medium +
FI Medium = High - Low =
BE High - High = Medium =
DE Low (2) = Low na na na
Group I
Group II
Group III
Group IV
Price-to-income Price-to-rental Econometric model
Pressures Qualifier (a) Pressures Qualifier (b) Pressures Qualifier (c)
 
(1) The qualifiers indicate higher (+), unchanged (=), or lower (-) 
downward pressures than those given by the basic pressures 
indicator. (a) Effort ratio; (b) Imputed rents; (c) Fundamentals 
dynamics. 
(2) Estonian and German house prices have recently been on an 
upward path. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
 
Countries are grouped according to the 
unsustainable developments in the last upswing 
identified in the housing cycle analysis of 
Section 1.1. Group I corresponds to Member 
States having experienced long and ample booms. 
Group II, in turn, refers to sudden and sharp 
booming periods, while Group III includes 
countries where house prices stayed above their 
trend for a prolonged period of time, averaging 
lower house price growth rates. Finally, 
Group IV stands for countries where no booming 
episodes were identified. (25) 
                                                        
(25) Portugal qualifies as a non-booming country due to its 
downward sloping trend. 
Three valuation indicators, together with their 
respective qualifiers, also allow us to classify 
countries according to low/medium/high 
downward price pressures. Among Member States 
in Group I and II, and given confirming signals 
from valuation methods, the adjustment process in 
Spain might continue further. On the other hand, 
current valuation indicators for Ireland and 
Estonia signal low or moderate pressures, 
although potential adverse developments in the 
fundamental determinants of Irish house prices 
and the recent turnaround of prices in Estonia 
should be followed carefully. Signals from 
valuation methods for Slovenia are somewhat 
equivocal, but the risk of adverse fundamental 
developments potentially points to medium-to-
high price pressures. Within Group III, Greece 
and France signal medium-to-high price 
pressures, but current economic conditions in the 
former would imply higher risks. Finally, among 
Group IV countries possible downward pressures 
are signalled in Malta, Luxembourg and Belgium. 
Downward pressures in Germany seem low and 
house prices have recently been increasing. 
Despite the absence of a clear house price boom 
in these countries before the crisis, these signals 
deserve further inspection. 
These results should be interpreted as warning 
signals pointing to countries where the housing 
market requires more in-depth analysis, also 
looking at institutional specificities and sub-
national developments. There is a need to better 
understand how structural features of the housing 
and mortgage markets, including tax incentives 
(see the specific contribution on housing taxation 
in this volume), affect real estate and credit 
developments and facilitate or hinder the 
emergence of imbalances on these markets. This 
should also be supplemented with an analysis of 
the disparities in housing valuation between 
regions/cities given that factors at play might 
differ between urban and rural or coastal areas. 
Assessing vulnerabilities stemming from the 
institutional and regulatory frameworks in the 
housing and mortgage markets and depicting local 
housing market specificities can help in designing 
sensible and specific policy responses in a 
consistent and comparable way. 
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Fiscal decentralisation and fiscal discipline 
This section presents new empirical evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and fiscal 
discipline. The analysis shows that fiscal decentralisation can have significant impacts on general government 
fiscal outcomes. Decentralising expenditure generally tends to improve the fiscal balance of the general 
government through moderating expenditure. However, much of the final impact depends on how subnational 
expenditure is financed, especially on the extent to which subnational revenues consist of transfers from central 
government, as well as on the degree of effective autonomy in setting subnational tax rates and the tax base. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that decentralisation works best when subnational authorities are largely self-
reliant, drawing their revenues mainly from subnational taxes and fees rather than from central government 
transfers, thereby creating incentives for responsible fiscal behaviour. 
Taxation of housing 
This section describes the current state of housing taxation in the euro area and looks at some design 
principles for housing taxation systems. The low ratio of property taxes to GDP in most of the euro area 
indicates that there is room for shifting from personal and corporate income tax towards property taxes. A shift 
could lead to stronger growth in the short-to-medium run. Several euro area countries should move away from 
(high) taxes on residential property transactions to a recurrent tax on residential property, since the latter is 
less distortive and forms a more stable revenue base. Many euro area tax systems allow mortgage interest 
deductibility, which often provides tax incentives for households to take on debt. In the absence of a sufficient 
level of taxation of imputed rents from housing, mortgage interest deductibility introduces an implicit subsidy 
to property investment and may increase the risk of over-investment in housing. 
Risk and uncertainty in euro area sovereign debt markets  
The crisis has brought a rise in risk premia on euro area financial markets, with a surge in sovereign bond 
yields in some Member States. This section analyses euro area sovereign bond spreads in an econometric 
framework that relates spreads to macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g. the debt to GDP ratio) and liquidity risks. 
The econometric analysis suggests two main conclusions. First, investors' risk behaviours have changed since 
the beginning of the crisis. For example, investors now ask higher spreads for a given level of public debt or 
deficit and they have also become more aware of implicit sovereign liabilities related to banks. Second, a 
significant part of the recent surge in sovereign spreads in some Member States cannot be explained by 
traditional macroeconomic variables. Further analysis indicates that this unexplained part of spreads is related 
to common euro area risk factors and a rise in policy-related uncertainty. The surge in spreads could therefore 
be partly reversed by a consistent implementation of EMU reforms, as proposed in the European Commission’s 
recent Blueprint for a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union. The analysis shows that consistent 
policies, leading to a reduction of the component of spreads that is driven by policy uncertainty, will have 
positive effects on growth, given in particular the spillovers of sovereign borrowing costs to the private sector. 
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II.1. Fiscal decentralisation and fiscal 
discipline 
This section analyses the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation to the subnational level and 
fiscal outcomes for general government. (26) The 
purpose is to assess whether devolving 
expenditure functions and revenue sources to 
subnational entities, as has generally occurred 
across the euro area, may have adverse 
consequences on overall government fiscal 
balances. Such consequences might be due to loss 
of central government control over subnational 
fiscal behaviour and to weaker incentives for 
fiscal discipline at that level. 
Some theoretical considerations on the impact 
of fiscal decentralisation on fiscal outcomes 
The literature on fiscal federalism provides some 
theoretical priors regarding the effects of different 
aspects of fiscal decentralisation on the main 
fiscal aggregates of the general government. (27) 
However, in most cases, the net impact is a priori 
ambiguous.  
Decentralising expenditure could have either 
positive or negative effects on the fiscal balance. 
The government balance may improve, with lower 
expenditure due to efficiency gains, as public 
services can be tailored to subnational needs and 
preferences. Furthermore, competition and 
sharing best practices among decentralised entities 
regarding the provision of public goods and 
services may result in savings. On the other hand, 
decentralising expenditure might harm the 
government balance by reducing economies of 
scale and by leading to work being duplicated at 
national and subnational levels. Ties between 
subnational authorities and constituent interest 
groups may also be more direct, possibly giving 
the latter more lobbying power, leading to more 
expenditure. 
                                                        
(26) For a more detailed analysis see Part IV of European 
Commission (2012), ‘Report on Public finances in EMU’, 
European Economy, No 4-2012 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_
economy/2012/public-finances-in-emu-2012_en.htm  
(27) See among others Oates, W. (2006), ‘On theory and practice 
of fiscal decentralisation’, IFIR Working Paper Series, 2006–
05 (Lexington: Institute for Federalism & Intergovernmental 
Relations); Blöchliger, H. and O. Petzold (2009), ‘Taxes or 
grants: what revenue source for sub-central governments?’, 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers 706, OECD 
Publishing; IMF (2009), ‘Macro policy lessons for a sound 
design of fiscal decentralisation’, Paper prepared by the IMF 
Fiscal Affairs Department. 
Theoretical considerations are thus inconclusive 
and the impact may not even be particularly 
significant in either direction. A significant part of 
subnational government expenditure is likely to 
be mandated by national directives and 
legislation, so local influence on spending may in 
any case be limited.  
Decentralising sources of revenue may also 
affect fiscal balances. Subnational revenue has 
two main components. First, subnational 
authorities manage ‘own revenues’, taxes and fees 
levied at the subnational level, though the extent 
to which they can influence tax rates and the tax 
base varies. Second, transfers from central 
government can make up part of subnational 
revenue. Although the amount of such revenue is 
often beyond subnational control, it is classed as 
subnational revenue and is thus considered as part 
of fiscal decentralisation. 
Theoretical arguments are quite clear-cut as 
regards decentralising revenue. On the one hand, 
the literature makes clear that if subnational 
government can finance most of its spending with 
its own sources, it has strong incentives to behave 
in a fiscally responsible way. This has positive 
effects on the fiscal balance of the general 
government. This occurs because subnational 
government is more directly accountable to its 
constituents regarding spending, as there is a 
direct link between locally-levied taxes and 
locally-provided public goods or services. 
Moreover, if subnational government’s own 
resources are sufficient in principle, central 
government can more easily resist pressure to 
cover revenue shortfalls. 
On the other hand, if transfers from central 
government are a relatively large part of 
subnational budgets, the constraints on 
subnational government are ‘soft’, with adverse 
effects on the general government’s fiscal 
balance. This may occur because subnational 
government can justify substantial unfunded 
spending with the lack of own revenue sources. It 
may even threaten to scale down public services, 
eventually obliging central government to 
intervene with a bailout. In short, theoretical 
considerations alone cannot settle the fiscal case 
for decentralisation (especially on the expenditure 
side), hence the need for an empirical 
investigation. 
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Testing the impact of decentralisation with a 
regression analysis 
The rest of this section discusses the results of an 
econometric analysis of the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on fiscal outcomes of the general 
government. (28)  
The model used is the fiscal reaction function, an 
equation which tests the impact of the outstanding 
government debt ratio on the primary balance, 
after controlling for a number of macroeconomic 
and institutional variables.  
The basic underlying assumption is that 
governments are fiscally responsible and hence 
react to increasing (or decreasing) levels of 
accumulated debt by increasing (or decreasing) 
the primary balance. This methodology has 
become quite widespread in the empirical 
literature on fiscal policy (29) and has also been 
used recently to investigate the budgetary impact 
of fiscal decentralisation. (30) 
The regressions in Table II.1.1 alternatively use 
the primary balance, primary expenditure and 
total revenues of the general government as the 
dependent variable. In each case, the sample 
includes all 27 EU Member States and covers the 
years 1995–2010. 
The preceding discussion of the effects of fiscal 
decentralisation on fiscal behaviour suggests a 
number of hypotheses based on theoretical 
considerations that can be tested empirically.  
First, the net effect of decentralising expenditure 
on the primary balance should depend on how it is 
combined with decentralising revenue. If 
decentralised spending is combined with giving 
subnational government responsibility for 
covering spending with its own resources (i.e. 
taxes and fees assigned to subnational 
government) and if taxes, rather than transfers, 
                                                        
(28) For further details, see Governatori, M. and D. Yim (2012), 
‘Fiscal decentralisation and fiscal outcomes’, European 
Economy Economic Paper 468. 
(29) See for instance Bohn H. (1998), ‘The behavior of US public 
debt and deficits’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, 
pp. 949–63 and European Commission (2011), ‘Fiscal 
reaction functions and debt thresholds for the EU’, Public 
finances in EMU 2011, chapter IV.4, pp. 167-176). 
(30) (Eyraud, L. and L. Lusinyan (2011), ‘Decentralising spending 
more than revenue: Does it hurt fiscal performance?’, IMF 
Working Paper 226, International Monetary Fund and 
Escolano, J., L. Eyraud, M.L. Moreno Badia, J. Sarnes and A. 
Tuladhar (2012), ‘Fiscal performance, institutional design 
and decentralisation in European Union countries’, IMF 
Working Paper 45, International Monetary Fund.). 
account for most subnational revenue, there 
should be no adverse effect on the primary 
balance. There may even be a positive effect if 
subnational government is encouraged to raise 
more revenue as it seeks to cover more 
expenditure.  
On the other hand, if spending is decentralised 
while subnational government relies strongly on 
transfers from central government, this is likely to 
affect fiscal balances adversely. Subnational 
government is less likely to be concerned about 
balancing spending with revenue in this case. 
Overall, as fiscal balances are shaped by trends in 
both revenue and expenditure, these always need 
to be analysed in conjunction. 
Primary balance 
The first set of estimations tests the impact of 
decentralisation on the general government 
primary balance (as a share of GDP). The 
explanatory variables combined in these 
regressions are shown in Table II.1.1 and include 
the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio, the lagged primary 
balance (because of its persistence), the lagged 
output gap to control for the budgetary effect of 
cyclical fluctuations, as well as a dummy for the 
occurrence of a legislative election. (31) 
Additionally, the following indicators are 
included, which together provide a detailed 
characterisation of the degree and composition of 
revenue and expenditure decentralisation: 
• Expenditure decentralisation, defined as the 
percentage of subnational government 
expenditure in total expenditures of the general 
government; 
• Own revenue decentralisation, defined as the 
percentage of subnational taxes and fees (i.e. 
subnational own revenue) in general 
government revenue; 
• Tax revenue as a percentage of subnational 
revenue; (32) 
                                                        
(31) This is systematically found to have good explanatory power 
of the developments of fiscal balances (see among others 
Mendoza, E.G. and J.D. Ostry (2008), ‘International evidence 
on fiscal solvency: is fiscal solvency ‘responsible’?’, Journal 
of Monetary Economics 55, 1081-1093, and Gali, J., and 
R. Perotti, 2003, ‘Fiscal policy and monetary integration in 
Europe’, Economic Policy, Vol. 18, No. 37, pp. 533–72). 
(32) This does not include fees, which are also part of own 
resources. . 
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• Transfers from central government as a 
percentage of subnational revenue; 
• The extent to which subnational spending is 
covered by own revenue, defined as the 
percentage of subnational expenditures 
covered by subnational taxes and fees. (33) 
Moreover, to test some of the hypotheses 
mentioned previously concerning the impact of 
varying combinations of decentralisation, the 
following interactive terms (i.e. the product of two 
variables) are also included in the regressions: 
• Expenditure decentralisation and the share of 
transfers in subnational revenue; 
• Expenditure decentralisation and the share of 
subnational taxes in subnational revenues; 
• Own-revenue decentralisation and the share of 
transfers in subnational revenue; 
• Own-revenue decentralisation and the share of 
taxes in subnational revenue. 
Results of estimates for the primary balance are 
shown in Table 1. Regarding the control variables, 
some general features of the fiscal reaction 
function (i.e. with no direct relationship with 
decentralisation) are worth noting. A central result 
is that the lagged debt has the expected 
statistically significant positive coefficient in all 
specifications of the model, suggesting that the 
authorities’ desire to ensure debt sustainability 
influences fiscal policies. The lagged output gap 
has a negative and mostly significant coefficient, 
suggesting some degree of pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policy across the EU. Elections tend to have a 
negative impact on the primary balance, but this is 
not always significant. 
• As for indicators of decentralisation, 
decentralising expenditure has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the primary 
balance. Subnational expenditure coverage — 
i.e. the extent to which subnational 
expenditure is ‘self-financed’ via own 
resources — has a positive and significant 
effect on the primary balance, as would be 
expected on the basis of the disciplining effect 
                                                        
(33) This indicator measures the decentralisation of revenues 
relative to expenditures. A gap between expenditures and 
own revenues must be covered by transfers or subnational 
borrowing. A lower gap should indicate a ‘harder budget 
constraint’ for subnational governments. 
of reliance on own resources (see Column 7). 
Similarly, decentralising expenditure has a 
(further) positive effect if interacted with the 
share of taxes in subnational revenue 
(Column 3). This confirms the expectation that 
decentralising expenditure has a more 
favourable impact on the primary balance if 
subnational governments raise a large 
proportion of their revenue as own taxes.  
Conversely, when decentralised expenditure is 
combined with subnational revenue dependent to 
a large extent on transfers from central 
government, the effect on the primary balance is 
negative (Columns 2, 10, 12 and 13). 
The overall impact of decentralising revenue on 
the primary balance is negative and statistically 
significant across all model specifications. The 
overall effect, however, depends on the way in 
which decentralisation is organised. The shares of 
taxes and transfers have, respectively, a positive 
and negative effect on the primary balance when 
included individually (Columns 4 and 5). These 
effects are confirmed when combining tax and 
transfer indicators with the revenue 
decentralisation indicator (Columns 6 and 8 for 
taxes and Column 9 for transfers). The effect of 
the interactive term with taxes and revenue 
decentralisation more or less offsets the negative 
direct effect on the primary balance of revenue 
decentralisation. 
Finally, a robustness check of the impact of 
subnational taxation on the fiscal balance was 
carried out by estimating the effect of ‘true’ tax 
autonomy, i.e. the share of taxes for which 
subnational governments can change the rate 
and/or base. (34) This is captured via three 
interactive terms (Columns 13, 11 and 12). (35) 
                                                        
(34) Figures on the shares of taxes in subnational revenues do not 
distinguish autonomous taxes, i.e. on which subnational 
governments are allowed to change main tax parameters, 
from the assignment of revenues from national taxes to 
subnational governments. This may prevent to fully capture 
the ‘true’ degree of subnational financial autonomy. Hence, 
robustness checks were carried out with an indicator of ‘true’ 
subnational tax autonomy compiled by the OECD Secretariat. 
The OECD indicator is unfortunately only available for a 
relatively small sample of countries and for the years 1995, 
2002, 2005 and 2008. 
(35) (i) Share of subnational tax revenues on which subnational 
governments can exert autonomy multiplied by the share of 
taxes in total subnational revenues (Column 13); 
(ii) Expenditure decentralisation times the term (i), in order to 
test the joint impact of large decentralisation on the spending 
side and large ‘true’ revenue autonomy (Column 11); 
(iii) Share of subnational expenditures covered by 
subnational taxes and fees times the share of subnational tax 
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Results again confirm expectations, in that greater 
tax autonomy improves the primary balance.  
Expenditure 
Further regressions were also estimated, including 
general government primary expenditure as the 
dependent variable, instead of the primary balance 
(results not shown, see Governatori and 
Yim, 2012). This enables investigation of whether 
decentralisation has any systematic bearing on the 
absolute level of spending, as opposed to the 
balance of spending and revenue. The model is 
adapted relative to that for the primary balance, 
with the addition of inflation and trade openness 
as further control variables. The main results in 
                                                                                  
revenues on which subnational governments can exert 
autonomy; this would capture the coverage of subnational 
expenditures by autonomous revenues (Column 12). 
When the term (ii) is included the interactive term of 
expenditure decentralisation and the share of taxes in 
subnational revenues is no longer significant (Column 11), 
suggesting that it is the true tax autonomy rather than the 
share of tax revenues assigned to subnational governments as 
such which improves fiscal balances. 
terms of the impact of decentralisation aspects are 
as follows: 
• Decentralising expenditure per se is associated 
with lower levels of general government 
expenditure, whereas decentralising tax 
revenue to the subnational level tends to 
increase expenditure. 
• Decentralising expenditure in combination 
with higher shares of central transfers in 
subnational revenue typically increases 
spending levels, but, if combined with 
relatively higher shares of taxes, lowers 
expenditure. 
• Similar results are found for the interaction 
between own-revenue decentralisation and the 
share of transfers and taxes in subnational 
revenue, respectively. 
These findings support the theoretical argument 
that decentralising expenditure should increase 
public sector efficiency, as public goods and 
services can be tailored to subnational 
 
Table II.1.1: Regressions on the effect of fiscal decentralisation on the primary balance  
of general government (LSDVC estimator, EU27, 1995-2010) (1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
VARIABLES
L.D 0.03* 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03** 0.02* 0.03** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04***
L.og -0.1** -0.12*** -0.1** -0.09* -0.09** -0.08* -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.1** -0.1**
Expdec 0.12** 1.19*** 0.13** 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.4*** 0.47*** 0.52*** 1.22*** 0.57*** 1.2*** 1.2***
Revdec -0.12* -1.15*** -0.43*** -0.36*** -0.45*** -0.81*** -0.73*** -1.27*** -0.5*** -1.48*** -1.34*** -1.7*** -1.7***
Expcov 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.37*** 0.3*** 0.3***
Expdec* trsf -1.12*** -0.89*** -0.76*** -0.74***
Ele -0.45* -0.43* -0.44* -0.44* -0.37 -0.42* -0.29 -0.28 -0.25 -0.3 -0.31 -0.26 -0.26
Expdec* tax 0.34** -0.02
% tax 0.08***
% trsf -0.11***
Revdec* tax 0.87*** 0.73***
Revdec *trsf -1.15***
Tax *auton 0.06**
Expdec *tax*auton 0.04***
Expcov* auton 0.05***
Obs. 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 297 297 297
Number of panel 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 21 21 21
Pb
 
(1)  List of variables: pb = primary balance of general government (% of GDP), L.D = lagged stock of debt of general government (% of 
GDP), L.og = Lagged output gap (% of potential output), Expdec = expenditure decentralisation, Revdec = own revenue decentralisation, 
Expcov = coverage of subnational expenditures by own resources, Expdec*trsf = expenditure decentralisation*share of transfers in 
subnational revenues, Ele = legislative elections (1 if elections occurred in the year, 0 otherwise), Expdec*tax = expenditure 
decentralisation*share of taxes in subnational revenues, % tax = share of taxes in subnational revenues, % trsf = % of transfers in 
subnational revenues, revdec*tax = own revenue decentralisation* share of taxes in subnational revenues, revdec*trsf = own revenue 
decentralisation* share of transfers in subnational revenues, tax*auton = share of taxes in subnational revenues*share of autonomous taxes 
in subnational tax revenues, expdec*tax*auton = expenditure decentralisation*share of taxes in subnational revenues*share of autonomous 
taxes in subnational tax revenues, expcov*auton = coverage of subnational expenditures by own resources* share of autonomous taxes in 
subnational tax revenues. 
***, **, *: coefficient estimates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Commission services. 
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needs/preferences, while ‘healthy’ competition 
and mutual learning take place to find more 
efficient ways to provide public goods and 
services. The results suggest that the positive 
effect of a high level of financial responsibility 
and high subnational taxes/low transfers on the 
primary balance stems at least partly from the a 
restraining effect on expenditure, as the literature 
would predict. 
Revenue 
In analogy to the preceding section, the impact of 
fiscal decentralisation on revenue levels was also 
estimated through regressions. General 
government revenue and the tax burden (both as 
shares of GDP) were alternatively used as the 
dependent variable as a further robustness check. 
The main findings are that decentralising 
expenditure does not appear to have a significant 
effect on revenue or on the tax burden. By 
contrast, own-revenue decentralisation generally 
lowers revenue and the tax burden. Both for 
expenditure and revenue decentralisation, the 
interaction with the share of taxes in subnational 
revenue is positive and significant. (36) Thus, the 
degree of subnational expenditure coverage 
through own resources has a positive and 
significant impact on revenues and the tax burden. 
Overall, it appears that the impact of 
decentralisation is stronger on expenditure levels 
than on the revenue side. Two particular aspects 
of these findings complement the initial analysis, 
based on the primary balance. First, the general 
result that decentralisation of own revenues 
lowers the fiscal balance appears to be driven both 
by higher spending and lower revenue. Second, 
covering subnational spending to a greater extent 
from own resources (‘self-dependence’) positively 
affects fiscal balances, from both the revenue and 
expenditure side.  
Conclusions 
The analysis in this special topic shows that fiscal 
decentralisation in its various forms can have 
significant impacts on general government fiscal 
outcomes.  
Decentralising expenditure per se is associated 
with better fiscal balances compared to cases of 
                                                        
(36) In the case of revenue decentralisation only for the tax 
burden. 
low decentralisation. This primarily reflects a 
 
negative effect on expenditure, lending support to 
theoretical arguments that subnational 
government should be more able to tailor public 
goods and services to subnational 
needs/preferences and that competition and 
mutual learning among subnational governments 
should help them find more cost-effective ways of 
producing public goods and services. 
Furthermore, the interaction between expenditure 
and revenue decentralisation is crucial in 
determining overall fiscal performance. A case in 
point is the combination of decentralising 
expenditure with revenue arrangements that create 
perverse effects.  
For instance, if own resources finance 
decentralised expenditure only to a small extent, 
the fiscal balance tends to suffer. This result 
reflects effects on both the expenditure side and, 
to a lesser extent, the revenue side. It also 
confirms predictions in the literature that the more 
subnational government relies on central transfers, 
the more likely it is to experience ‘soft’ budget 
constraints that fail to foster responsible, and 
prudent fiscal behaviour. 
Conversely, greater reliance on revenue raised 
locally makes subnational government more 
accountable to subnational voters, as the link 
between subnational taxes and subnational 
services is stronger. This exerts a disciplining 
effect on subnational governments’ fiscal 
behaviour. The empirical results further show that 
having greater subnational autonomy in setting 
tax rates and tax bases tends to improve the 
overall fiscal balance even further. 
Overall, the analysis clearly shows that fiscal 
decentralisation matters for fiscal outcomes and 
that the interplay between expenditure and 
revenue is crucial to determine the net effect on 
fiscal balances. Criticisms that general fiscal 
deterioration across the euro area are being caused 
inter alia by a trend towards fiscal 
decentralisation do not seem to find support in the 
data. While such a link may hold in some Member 
States, the empirical analysis presented here 
suggests that this is not because decentralisation 
per se is bad. Rather, it is likely to be due to 
decentralisation being poorly designed, especially 
if it does not foster a sense of strong fiscal self-
reliance at subnational government level.  
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II.2. Taxation of housing 
There are several reasons for macroeconomists to 
monitor developments in the taxation of housing. 
There is evidence of property taxes (37) being the 
least distortive tax source, making a case for 
property taxes to play a greater role in tax systems 
than today. Taxation of housing furthermore 
influences investment and consumption decisions, 
and can thereby have implications for 
macroeconomic stability and labour mobility. 
This section describes the current state of taxation 
of housing in the euro area and looks at some 
design principles for taxation of housing. It also 
points to the favourable tax treatment of housing 
in the euro area, which encourages debt-building 
and over-investment in housing, and argues that 
there is a potential for shifting taxes towards 
recurrent taxes on property. (38)   
The contribution of recurrent property tax to 
overall revenue is low 
Property taxes generally play a relatively small 
role in the euro area in terms of revenue collected. 
While the average tax burden in the euro area in 
2010 was 38.9 %, the revenue from recurrent 
property taxes was on average 0.96 % of GDP. 
Adding other property-related taxes (including 
transaction taxes) the revenue amounted to 1.84 % 
of GDP. (39) 
The reliance on recurrent property taxes varies 
considerably between countries (Graph II.2.1). 
Recurrent taxes on property range from 2.3 % of 
GDP in France to nil in Malta. Belgium has the 
second highest income from recurrent property 
taxes, with 1.27 % of GDP. Revenues are below 
the euro area average in all but three euro area 
Member States. (40) 
                                                        
(37) In this text property taxes only refers to taxes on immovable 
property. 
(38) The work draws, to a large extent, on the paper by 
Johannesson Linden, Å. and C. Gayer (2012), ‘Possible 
reforms of real estate taxation: Criteria for successful 
policies’, European Economy, Occasional Papers No 119 
(October); and Chapter 5 of the report: European 
Commission (2012a), ‘Tax reforms in EU Member States 
2012’, European Economy, No 6 (written jointly by DG 
ECFIN and DG TAXUD). 
(39) Data come from the report European Commission (2012b), 
‘Taxation trends in the European Union’. 
(40) The data do not cover taxation of imputed rents, which falls 
under personal income taxation. This underestimates 
revenues from taxation of housing in Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. 
Recurrent tax revenue tends to be fairly stable 
over time. Revenues from recurrent property taxes 
as a share of GDP have amounted to between 
0.85 % and 0.97 % of GDP over the last 15 years 
for the euro area as a whole (Graph II.2.2). 
Graph II.2.1: Revenues from property taxes  
(in % of GDP, 2010) (1) 
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(1) Ordered by revenues from recurrent property taxes. Other 
property-related taxes include taxes on net wealth, inheritance, 
gifts and other property items and on financial and capital 
transactions. Data do not include personal income tax on imputed 
rents.  
(2) Data for Greece are provisional. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph II.2.2: Revenue from property taxes  
(in % of GDP, 1995-2010) (1) 
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(1) Averages are weighted. Other property-related taxes include 
taxes on net wealth, inheritance, gifts and other property items 
and on financial and capital transactions. Data do not include 
personal income tax on imputed rents. 
Source: Commission services. 
Tax revenue can be increased by broadening tax 
bases and/or by increasing tax rates. The relative 
stability of revenue observed in Graph II.2.2 
partly reflects the fact that the tax base, i.e. the 
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cadastral value (41), has often not been revised 
over the last two decades, drifting sometimes far 
away from property market values. 
Many euro area countries have not updated 
property values for many years. Examples include 
Austria, which applies cadastral values from 
1973, and Cyprus, with values from 1980. 
Belgium (1975) and Germany (mainly 1964) 
adjust cadastral values with inflation or a 
corrective factor not linked to house-price 
developments. According to the information 
available, at least ten euro area countries (BE, DE, 
EE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LU and AT) apply 
outdated property values. The Netherlands 
undertakes annual updates and some countries are 
currently reassessing their cadastral values. (42) 
The share of transaction taxes in property 
taxes is high despite their more distortive and 
volatile nature 
Other property-related taxes generated in 2010 on 
average about as much revenue as the recurrent 
tax on property. One of the main items in this 
category is transaction taxes on property. As 
indicated in Graph II.2.1, there are significant 
variations between countries in the ratio of the 
revenue from other property-related taxes to GDP. 
The revenue also fluctuated quite a lot over the 
period 1995-2010, from approximately 0.71 % of 
GDP in 1995 to 1.15 % of GDP in 2006 in the 
euro area (Graph II.2.2).  
Graph II.2.3 presents the changes in revenue from 
property taxes in euro area countries between 
2007 and 2010, a period of severe economic 
downturn. It shows that revenues from other 
property-related taxes (transaction taxes) were 
adversely affected, especially in Spain and 
Ireland, but also in Greece, Malta, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands. In Spain and Ireland revenue 
fell by approximately 1.2 % of GDP. By contrast, 
revenues from recurrent taxes proved to be much 
less sensitive to the recent crisis, even increasing 
slightly over the period in a number of countries 
(ES, IE, FR, FI and EE). (43) 
 
                                                        
(41) The cadastral value refers to the valuation of a property in a 
public register used for taxation purposes. 
(42) Johannesson Linden, Å. and C. Gayer (2012), op. cit. 
(43) Figures for Cyprus must be interpreted with caution as there 
might be some errors in the data. 
Graph II.2.3: Changes in revenue from  
property taxes (in % of GDP, 2007-2010) (1) 
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(1) Other property-related taxes include taxes on net wealth, 
inheritance, gifts and other property items and on financial and 
capital transactions. Data do not include personal income tax on 
imputed rents. 
(2) Data for Greece are provisional. 
Source: Commission services. 
The ranges of tax rates applied to property 
transactions in the euro area are presented in 
Table II.2.1. All but two countries apply 
transaction taxes on property. Belgium, Italy and 
Greece even apply tax on property transactions at 
rates of more than 10 %. (44) A second group of 
countries (FR, ES, LU, CY and PT) apply 
relatively high rates, in the range of 5-8 %. 
A drawback with transaction taxes is that they 
tend to discourage transactions that would allocate 
properties more efficiently, thereby making the 
market thinner. These taxes also have a negative 
impact on labour mobility given the high 
transaction costs incurred by changing property. 
The higher the rate, the more distortions will be 
created. Recurrent taxes are therefore preferable 
to transaction taxes on property. 
As indicated above, transaction taxes also tend to 
be more volatile than a recurrent tax. This volatile 
nature of transaction taxes is due to the fact that 
both the volume and the price of transactions tend 
to follow the business cycle. Significant revenue 
from transaction taxes in boom phases tends to 
lead policy makers to assess the budgetary 
situation too optimistically. Conversely, major 
revenue falls in downturns can produce an extra 
and unanticipated challenge for budgetary 
consolidation, aggravating the effect of business 
cycles. Thus, the volatility of transaction taxes 
contrasts with the more stable nature of recurrent 
                                                        
(44) Some of these structures are progressive, thus the rates do not 
reflect average tax levels. 
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taxes on property. Low predictability of tax 
revenue complicates budgetary planning, which is 
especially important for indebted countries. (45) 
 
Table II.2.1: Tax rates on property transactions 
in the euro area (2012) (1) 
Tax level Member State
≥10% BE, EL*, IT*
5-8% FR, ES, LU, CY*, PT*
<5% AT, DE, IE, MT, NL, SI, FI
None EE, SK  
(1) * indicates a progressive or multiple rate structure. In Italy 
some rates are levied on cadastral values rather than transaction 
values. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
A tax on real property transactions could 
potentially deter speculation and thus help reduce 
the risk of housing market bubbles. However, this 
relationship remains empirically ambiguous. It 
could also prove to be politically difficult to use 
the transaction tax as a timely policy response to 
mitigate price increases in the housing market. 
Moreover, other policies are available that can 
deal more effectively with housing market 
bubbles, such as capital requirements and loan-to-
value limits. (46) 
Some design principles for optimal taxation of 
housing 
Several approaches to designing taxes on 
residential property have been discussed in the 
literature. (47) A distinction should be made 
between business property, owner-occupied 
housing and rental housing. A company’s building 
assets are an input into the production process. 
Therefore the taxation of those business assets 
could severely distort resource allocation. In any 
event business building assets should not be taxed 
more than other inputs into production. Taxation 
of residential housing could be considered as part 
of the taxation of both consumption and the return 
                                                        
(45) See European Commission (2012b), op. cit. Revenues from 
transaction taxes are more cyclical than recurrent taxes as 
revenue depends not only on market prices, but also on the 
number of transactions. Moreover, a recurrent tax will still be 
more stable than taxation of real-time transactions, especially 
if cadastral values are updated periodically, e.g. after a few 
years instead of every year. 
(46) See Crowe C., G. Dell’Ariccia, D. Igan and P. Rababal 
(2011), ‘How to deal with real estate booms: Lessons from 
country experiences’, IMF Working Papers, No 11/91. 
(47) See for instance Mirrlees, J., S. Adam, T. Besley, R. 
Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P. Johnson, G. 
Myles and J. Portaba (2011) ‘Tax by design, the Mirrlees 
review’, Oxford University Press for Institute for Fiscal 
Studies or OECD (2010), ‘Tax policy reform and economic 
growth’, OECD Publishing. 
from investment/savings. (48) There are also good 
arguments for taxing land values, in the case of 
both business and residential properties. 
As housing is an asset, a natural starting point is 
that housing should be treated in the same way as 
other capital investments in the tax system. A 
house that is rented out will generate rental 
income that can be seen as capital income and 
taxed at the same rates as other capital income. If 
the owner alternatively chooses to live in the 
house, he or she will benefit from the return on 
the investment, in the form of an imputed rent, 
which should be taken into account and measured. 
When imputed rent payments are taxed, 
deductibility for depreciation allowances and 
mortgage interest payments should apply so that 
the net capital investment is taxed. Consistent 
with the treatment of other financial assets, capital 
gains from housing transactions should also be 
taxed in order to achieve neutrality vis-à-vis 
investment in other assets. A tax on imputed 
rental income could be approximated through an 
annual recurrent tax on the property. This assumes 
that imputed rents are proportional to property 
values. Property values should then be set as close 
as possible to actual market values. 
At the same time, housing provides a service. It 
provides accommodation and a place to store 
goods, eat and socialise, which is a set of 
consumable services. Like other consumption 
goods and services, it could be covered by value 
added tax. The tax would then be regarded as a 
levy on the present value of the stream of services 
that the house will generate in the future. It means 
that VAT should be applied when the house is 
sold the first time. This would be in line with the 
treatment of other durable goods, e.g. cars or 
refrigerators. Another alternative is to apply a tax 
on the flow of services from housing over time. 
That translates into taxing the rent or the imputed 
rent for owner-occupied housing, preferably at the 
standard VAT rate. Estimating the imputed rent 
for owner-occupied housing properly and fairly 
involves some practical difficulties and most 
countries do not apply this approach. To achieve 
equal treatment between owner-occupied and 
rental housing they do not levy VAT on rental 
payments either. 
                                                        
(48) In the Mirrlees review recommendations build on both an 
asset approach and a consumption approach. OECD (2010) 
(op. cit.) note that return on investments other than housing is 
normally taxed first at corporate and personal level and then 
taxed with VAT when the return is consumed. For housing, 
applying VAT and the asset approach would mean that such 
taxation takes place in the reverse order. 
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Land is an especially attractive tax base. The 
supply of land is fixed (i.e. price-inelastic) and 
will not be affected by a tax. A tax on land will 
therefore reduce the selling price by the same 
amount and only reduce earnings to landowners. 
Land buyers will face the same (tax-augmented) 
prices of land after the introduction of the land 
tax. There is therefore no distortion arising from 
this tax, which makes it especially attractive for 
revenue purposes. Taxing landownership 
translates simply into taxing an economic rent and 
involves a transfer of earnings from landowners to 
local or central governments. It is, however, hard 
to distinguish land values from properties 
(buildings and other structures) built on it. The 
markets for land without any buildings will tend 
to be narrow, at least in some areas, and prices 
could be difficult to observe. As market prices for 
properties will normally include land values and 
as there are other good reasons for taxing 
residential property, property taxes could act as a 
proxy for taxing land values and thereby avoid the 
additional complexity of valuing land separately. 
Globalisation has implications for policy design. 
Capital and labour have become increasingly 
mobile and less efficient to tax. This might imply 
that countries need to rethink their tax structures. 
Taxation of property is regarded as the tax least 
affected by globalisation and should therefore 
gain momentum in a country’s tax structure. 
Another advantage of immovable property as a 
tax base is that property ownership is generally 
easy to establish and identify, and thus the tax is 
difficult to evade. 
Favourable tax treatment of housing in the 
euro area: debt-bias and over-investment risk 
In most countries owner-occupied housing 
receives favourable tax treatment compared to 
taxation of other forms of investment. 
Firstly, capital gains on residences are often 
exempted from capital gains tax, in particular 
when gains are on primary residences. In some 
countries the exemption is made dependent on 
how long the owner has lived in the house before 
sale. 
Secondly, there are only a few countries that 
apply taxation to imputed rental income on main 
residences in the euro area. These are the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. In Belgium, Spain 
and Italy, taxes on imputed rents apply to 
residences other than the main dwelling. Even if 
recurrent property taxes are regarded as a proxy 
for a tax on imputed rents, the rates and the tax 
bases are normally too low in comparison with the 
tax treatment of other capital assets. Valuation of 
properties is, as indicated earlier, often outdated 
and can be far below market prices. 
Thirdly, ten euro area countries apply some form 
of mortgage interest deductibility for owner-
occupied properties. (49) In the presence of 
mortgage interest deductibility, a tax on imputed 
rents and/or a recurrent property tax are essential 
to balance the tax subsidy provided by the 
deductibility. The tax is needed to achieve neutral 
tax treatment of various investment possibilities. 
If interest deductibility is provided to house-
owners while imputed rental income is either (i) 
not taxed (or taxed too low) or (ii) approximated 
with a recurrent property tax which is generally 
low, an implicit tax subsidy is provided which 
favours investments in owner-occupied housing 
and household indebtedness through mortgage 
loans. Hence there is a risk that households will 
be encouraged to invest too much in housing in 
relation to other assets, which could contribute to 
higher private-sector debt and an over-allocation 
of capital to the housing sector, which is normally 
not considered to be the most productive 
economic sector. 
Empirical studies also indicate that reduced 
interest costs due to interest deductibility are 
capitalised into higher house prices. (50) Tax 
subsidies for mortgage interest payments have 
also been found to be correlated with price 
volatility on the housing market. (51) 
In this context, a first-best solution is either to tax 
imputed rents, but these rents are difficult to 
measure in practice. An alternative is to increase 
                                                        
(49) A detailed overview of the current treatment of mortgage 
interest deductibility in Europe is given in European 
Commission (2012a), op. cit. 
(50) See for instance Capozza, D.R., R.K. Green and P.H. 
Hendershott (1996), ‘Taxes, mortgage borrowing, and 
residential land prices’, In ‘Economic effects of fundamental 
tax reform’, ed. Aaron, H. and W. Gale, Brookings 
Institution, pp. 171-198; Harris, B. (2010), ‘The effect of 
proposed tax reforms on metropolitan housing prices’, Tax 
Policy Center, Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. 
Other results indicate that demand shocks (e.g. through 
financial deregulation) have a greater likelihood of being 
capitalised into real house prices when the country provides 
interest deductibility. Andrews, D. (2010) ‘Real house prices 
in OECD countries: The role of demand shocks and structural 
and policy factors’, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No 831, OECD Publishing. 
(51) Van den Noord, P. (2003), ‘Tax incentives and house price 
volatility in the euro area: Theory and evidence’, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No 356, OECD 
Publishing; Andrews, D. (2010), op. cit. 
II. Special topics on the euro area economy 
 
- 29 - 
the recurrent tax on property, which can be seen 
as an approximation of a tax on imputed rents. A 
second-best design of the taxation of owner-
occupied housing could be: (i) not to allow 
mortgage interest deductibility and (ii) to levy a 
(lower) recurrent tax on property. In this way, 
housing investments would still be taxed and the 
tax system would not favour debt. 
The application of VAT on housing also varies 
across euro area countries, which means that 
consumption of housing services in the euro area 
is only partly exposed to VAT. (52) More than half 
of these countries apply VAT on the sale of new 
dwellings, but many countries apply lower rates 
than the standard rate. Different practices apply to 
the VAT treatment of construction, alteration and 
maintenance of property. The rental of residential 
properties is normally exempt or zero-rated. 
Overall, only part of the consumption of housing 
services is taxed. 
Shifting the tax burden towards recurrent 
property tax 
Empirical studies by the OECD rank the type of 
taxes according to their effect on economic 
growth and find recurrent property taxes to be the 
least harmful type. (53) This suggests that a rise in 
property taxes should play an important role when 
considering an increase in revenue or a shift in the 
tax burden. 
A reform shifting the tax burden from more 
distortive taxes (e.g. labour taxes) towards 
property taxes could then enhance growth. The 
same is true for tax shifts within property taxes, 
moving the tax burden from high transaction taxes  
to recurrent taxes on property. Table II.2.2 
identifies the countries in the euro area where 
such shifts appear particularly attractive. (54) 
Many euro area countries (DE, EE, EL, IT, CY, 
MT, AT, PT, SI, SK and FI) have low recurrent 
taxes on property and might have potential for 
increases. Of these countries, Germany, Italy, 
                                                        
(52) Information has mainly been collected from OECD (2011), 
‘The taxation of residential property: Background note for the 
November Roundtable at Working Party No 2, 
(3 November). 
(53) See for instance OECD (2010), op. cit.; Johannesson Linden, 
Å. and C. Gayer. (2012), op. cit., also gives an overview of 
empirical results on tax shifting and its impacts on GDP. 
(54) A country is considered to face a challenge related to a high 
tax burden on labour and is evaluated to have low recurrent 
taxation of housing if the respective indicator is significantly 
worse than the weighted EU27 average. For more 
information see chapter 5 in European Commission (2012a, 
ibid). 
Austria and Finland also have a high tax burden 
on labour, which might indicate both a need and 
room for shifting taxes from labour to recurrent 
property taxes. The Netherlands, which applies 
taxation of imputed rents in addition to recurrent 
taxes on property, might also have potential for 
shifting tax from labour to housing. (55) 
 
Table II.2.2: Potential for tax shifts (1) 
Country Potential for tax 
shift within 
property taxes
High tax 
burden on 
labour
Low recurrent 
taxes on 
property 
Potential 
for tax shift
High transaction 
taxes
BE X X
DE (X) X (X)
EE X
IE
EL X X
ES X
FR X X
IT X X X X
CY X X
LU X
MT X
NL (X)
AT (X) X (X)
PT X X
SI X
SK X
FI (X) X (X)
Potential for tax shift from labour to property
 
(1) A euro area country displaying both a fairly high tax burden 
on labour and low recurrent taxes on property may consider a tax 
shift from labour to property. (X) depicts borderline cases 
reflecting relatively high employment rates in some countries.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Raising revenues from recurrent property taxes to 
the euro area average of 0.96 % of GDP would for 
instance correspond to an increase of around 
0.5 % of GDP in the case of Slovenia, Germany 
and Slovakia.   
Tax shifts within property taxes would also be 
particularly relevant for countries with high 
transaction rates. A gradual shift from a tax on 
property transactions to a recurrent tax on 
property could potentially improve the 
functioning of the housing market in several 
countries (particularly BE, EL and IT but also ES, 
FR, LU, CY and PT). (56) 
                                                        
(55) This analysis does not take into account the application of 
VAT or a capital income or capital gains tax to housing, 
which preferably also should be considered. 
(56) A country is considered to have a particularly high 
transaction tax if the country has a tax rate equal to or above 
5 %. 
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Conclusion 
The low ratio of property taxes to GDP in most of 
the euro area indicates that there is room to shift 
taxation towards property taxes. Many euro area 
countries could consider shifting from personal 
and corporate income taxes to consumption and 
property taxes in order to increase GDP per capita 
in the long run. A shift could result in stronger 
growth in the short-to-medium run.  
A transaction tax reduces the number of 
transactions and thereby makes the market 
thinner. It can adversely affect labour mobility, 
and discourages transactions that would allocate 
the housing stock more efficiently. A recurrent tax 
on residential property is less distortive and forms  
 
a more stable revenue base. Thus, many euro area 
countries should consider shifting away from 
(high) taxes on residential property transfers to a 
recurrent tax on residential property. A way to do 
that would be to reduce transaction taxes and 
update cadastral values according to market 
values. 
The tax systems in the euro area generally allow 
mortgage interest deductibility without taxing 
imputed rents sufficiently, which often provides 
tax incentives for households to over-invest in 
housing and to take on debt. Euro area countries 
should consider measures to ensure that such an 
implicit subsidy to housing investment does not 
take place.   
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II.3. Risk and uncertainty in euro area 
sovereign debt markets and their 
impact on economic activity 
Introduction 
Risk and uncertainty are two important concepts 
in economics and finance. Risk is understood to 
be measurable, while uncertainty is not. (57) 
Finance and economics have traditionally 
emphasised the role of quantifiable risk. For 
example, in modern portfolio theory risk is 
calculated using statistical probability of asset 
returns. Another example is borrower default risk, 
which is estimated by credit score calculations 
including quantitative elements. The word 
uncertainty, on the other hand, is often used to 
describe situations where risks are difficult to 
quantify, for instance because the chances that 
they occur are extremely slim. The financial crisis 
has refocused attention on so-called ‘tail risks’, 
which relate to events with little historical record 
of occurrence and unknown (but potentially large) 
impact. Tail risks are, therefore, to a large extent 
immeasurable. When the presence of incalculable 
uncertainty is acknowledged, investors start 
hoarding liquidity for self-insurance and drive up 
risk premia. (58) 
Both calculable risk and uncertainty are present in 
risk premium determination and thus affect 
economic activity. For example, during the pre-
crisis years lower risk premia contributed to 
keeping long-term interest rates down and 
supported housing markets and consumer 
spending. Conversely, risk premia have surged in 
some countries since the onset of the crisis, with a 
negative impact on the economy.   
The purpose of this section is to shed some light 
on the drivers of the changes in risk premia since 
the crisis. It first reviews a number of indicators 
of measurable risk and immeasurable uncertainty. 
It then quantifies the relationship between euro 
area sovereign bond spreads and their 
determinants, trying to identify the respective 
roles of calculable risk and uncertainty. Last, the 
                                                        
(57) There is a body of literature on the difference between the 
two concepts; see Knight, F. (1921): Risk, uncertainty and 
profit, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, on the concept of 
Knightian uncertainty, and Ellsberg, D. (1961): Risk, 
ambiguity, and the savage axioms, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics Vol. 75, No 4, on its application in finance. 
(58) Risks arising from financial crises are difficult to insure 
because often it is impossible to calculate the likelihood of a 
crisis. Moreover, the consequences of a crisis are frequently 
modified by those affected. Hence it is difficult to determine 
whether the crisis is the cause or the consequence.  
section investigates the impact of falling 
sovereign risk premia on the real economy, 
including spillover effects into the corporate bond 
market. 
Various measures of risk 
The risk premium is the extra compensation for 
holding an asset which carries anticipated and 
measurable asset-specific and economy-specific 
risk but also non-measurable uncertainty. Risk 
premia are well reflected in the spreads between 
various risky and risk-free asset returns. Spreads 
can give information about the magnitude of the 
underlying risk and its possible macroeconomic 
impact. For example, the Euribor-OIS spread is a 
proxy of counterparty risk on the wholesale 
banking markets, (59) while the spread between 
government bonds and the swap rate represents 
the bonds’ default risk. 
Non-spread measures of risk are also widely used. 
The health of the financial system can be 
measured by bank borrowing costs, and by capital 
and profitability ratios. In the non-financial 
corporate sector, risk indicators are linked to 
corporate profitability and leverage. Stock market 
volatility reflects risk in economy-wide outcomes. 
Derivative markets are a distinct source of risk 
indicators, having recently become especially 
popular in measuring risk on sovereign debt 
markets. Spreads in credit default swaps (CDS) 
are similar to an insurance premium, offering 
protection against bond default by the issuer. The 
more risky the underlying bond, the higher the 
CDS spread, as bond investors become more 
likely to purchase default insurance. 
Indicators to gauge investors’ appetite for 
accepting risks also exist. A global measure of 
risk aversion can be tracked looking at the VIX 
index, which is used to predict the likelihood of 
large swings in equity prices solely based on 
investors’ risk attitude. (60) 
Gauging the presence of immeasurable 
macroeconomic uncertainty is (by definition) 
considerably more difficult. Ex-ante forecast 
disagreement and ex-post forecast errors can 
provide an aggregate measure of macroeconomic 
                                                        
(59) OIS stands for overnight indexed swap. 
(60) The VIX index is a forward-looking measure of near-term 
volatility conveyed by the S&P 500 stock index option 
prices. Since it is derived from market prices of traded 
options, it signals market expectations of future volatility and 
changes in risk preference.  
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 4/2012 
 
- 32 - 
uncertainty. (61) Surprise movements in either 
measure are often associated with significant 
changes in output and employment. In recent 
years, a number of risk indicators linked to policy 
surprises and economic and political news have 
also been proposed. Graph II.3.1 shows that an 
increase in uncertainty, as captured by the higher 
values of the EPU index’ news component, is 
associated with higher sovereign bond 
spreads. (62) 
Estimating risk and uncertainty in the euro 
area sovereign bond markets 
Econometric analysis of sovereign spread 
determinants can be used to better understand the 
large rise in sovereign borrowing costs observed 
in several euro area Member States since 2010. 
The econometric analysis presented in Box II.3.1 
shows that recent changes in risk premia cannot 
entirely be explained by calculable measures of 
risk and that immeasurable uncertainty plays an 
increasingly important role in determining risk 
premia. (63) 
Most of the available empirical studies find a 
statistically significant relationship between 
sovereign bond yield spreads and country-specific 
fundamentals, such as the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
government deficit and growth outlook. (64) 
However, research covering the period after the 
crisis shows that the actual increase in sovereign 
spreads in some euro area countries cannot be 
fully explained by models that contain only 
country-specific measurable variables. This 
remains largely true even if changes in liquidity 
conditions, investor risk attitudes, the size and 
leverage of the national banking system and 
                                                        
(61) The utilisation of dispersion indexes of expectations as 
proxies for uncertainty has a long tradition in the literature, 
mainly in the context of inflation expectations; see for 
instance Bachman R., S. Elstner and E. Sims (2010): 
Uncertainty and economic activity: Evidence from business 
survey data, NBER Working paper 16143; Bomberger, W. 
(1996): Disagreement as a Measure of Uncertainty, Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, No 3. 
(62) The Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) Index consists of 
two components: one quantifies newspaper coverage on 
economic policy uncertainty, while the other evaluates 
disagreement among economic forecasters. A European 
version of the index exists. See Baker, S., N. Bloom and 
S. Davis, (2012): Measuring economic policy uncertainty, 
Stanford University, mimeo. 
(63) Coefficients are similar to those in Barrios S., P. Iversen, M. 
Lewandowska and R. Setzer (2009): Determinants of intra-
euro area government bond spreads during the financial 
crisis, European Economy, No 388. 
(64) For an evaluation of sovereign bond yield determinants, see 
Poghosyan, T., (2012): Long-run and short-run determinants 
of sovereign bond yields in advanced economies, IMF 
Working Paper, No 12/271. 
contagion effects among euro area Member States 
are controlled for. (65) 
Graph II.3.1: News component of the European 
EPU index versus sovereign spreads of the 
vulnerable euro area countries  
(2006Q1-2012Q3)  (1) 
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(1) The news component of the Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index is on the horizontal axis, the weighted average of 10-year 
sovereign bond spreads in the vulnerable countries is on the 
vertical axis. GR, IT, ES, IE and PT are the vulnerable euro area 
Member States. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
This conclusion is supported by the econometric 
analysis presented in Box II.3.1, which reveals 
that investors' risk behaviours have changed since 
the beginning of the crisis. More specifically, the 
econometric analysis shows that since the crisis 
the role of public debt in determining spreads (i.e. 
its estimated coefficient) has increased. 
Furthermore, changes in the fiscal balance and 
bond market liquidity have had a statistically 
meaningful impact on sovereign bond spreads 
only since the start of the crisis and not earlier. 
In addition, the negative feedback loop between 
the performance of the countries’ banking sectors 
and their sovereign risk premia became evident 
during the crisis as investors started to require a 
higher premium to cater for the risk that 
governments may have to step in to support 
domestic banks under stress. As a proxy for the 
health of the banking sector, the analysis includes 
a measure for lending to euro area credit 
institutions by the Eurosystem. The econometric 
                                                        
(65) See Favero, C., A. Missale (2011): Sovereign spreads in the 
euro area: Which prospects for a Eurobond? CEPR 
Discussion Paper, No 8637; Gerlach, S., A. Schulz and 
G. Wolff (2010): Banking and sovereign risk in the 
Eurozone, CEPR Discussion Paper, No 7833; and Beirne, J 
and F. Fratzscher (2012): The Pricing of Sovereign Risk and 
Contagion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, ECB 
Working Paper.  
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results show that higher bank dependence on 
central bank lending is associated with higher 
home-country bond spreads. 
Graph II.3.2: Market spreads versus model-based 
spreads in the vulnerable and core euro area 
Member States (in pp, 2006Q1-2012Q3) (1) 
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(1) Model-based spreads are fitted values from a panel regression 
of sovereign spreads on public debt, GDP growth and current 
account balance. The additional risk indicators are debt 
dynamics, liquidity, systemic risk, the crisis regime and post-
crisis official lending to banks. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
Nevertheless, even if changes in the role of certain 
sovereign spread determinants are introduced into 
the model, a significant part of the recent surge in 
sovereign spreads in some Member States remains 
unexplained. This suggests that movements in 
sovereign bond spreads are not only affected by 
country-specific macroeconomic developments 
but also by non-measurable risk factors, in 
particular in relation to economic policy and 
EMU. 
More precisely, the spreads predicted by the 
model track actual market spreads before the 
crisis very closely. However, a gap between actual 
and predicted spreads is evident as from 2010 and 
has become especially large and persistent since 
the beginning of 2011 (Graph II.3.2). The 
movements differ in direction and magnitude 
among Member States. In vulnerable countries, 
such as Italy, Portugal and Spain, market spreads 
exceed their respective model-based spreads. 
Movement in the opposite direction can be 
observed in Member States, such as France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, where the flight to 
safety by bond investors pushed yields below 
levels suggested by the model. 
Assessing the role of non-measureable risk 
A closer look at the sovereign spread regression 
residuals in those Member States which have been 
under intense market pressure reveals that they are 
moving together. This suggests that investors are 
pricing a common risk factor, perhaps related to a 
potential redenomination of public debt or to 
economic governance uncertainty in parts of the 
euro area. To try to reduce this gap, two additional 
indicators are included in the estimation. 
The first additional indicator is related to spread 
co-movement across euro area Member States. 
The common variability of sovereign bond 
spreads (a common euro area risk factor) is 
extracted out of country-specific sovereign bond 
spreads (via a principal component analysis) and 
added to the model as an explanatory variable. 
The indicator is significant, confirming the 
hypothesis of a commonality present in the euro 
area sovereign bond markets. (66) 
The second additional indicator is the news 
component of the Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index, which tracks the coverage of economic and 
political uncertainty in euro area newspapers that 
is not country-specific. This indicator is also 
statistically significant, validating the hypothesis 
that euro area-wide policy uncertainty affects 
sovereign bond risk premia. 
The introduction of the common euro area risk 
factor or the common policy uncertainty news 
index decreases the unexplained part of the 
sovereign bond risk premia but does not 
completely eliminate it. This result is in line with 
recent literature, suggesting a decoupling of 
observed spreads from information that can be 
derived from macroeconomic fundamentals and 
the emergence of an immeasurable component of 
the risk premia, i.e. uncertainty, which is only 
partially controlled here with the introduction of 
the common euro area risk factor or the policy 
uncertainty news index. 
Macroeconomic impact 
Whereas the econometric analysis points to a 
significant role for uncertainty in explaining the 
remaining difference between market spreads and 
model-based spreads, the rest of this section 
assesses the impact of this uncertainty on 
economic activity. DG ECFIN’s dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
  
                                                        
(66) Similar conclusion has been reached, for instance, by Di 
Cesare, A., G. Grande, M. Manna and M. Taboga (2012): 
Recent estimates of sovereign risk premia for euro area 
countries, Banca d’Italia Occasional Paper No 128.  
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Box II.3.1: Risk and uncertainty behind rising sovereign bond spreads in the euro area: panel estimations
Data 
The risk determinants driving the dynamics of euro area sovereign bonds are assessed via a panel regression model 
of 10-year sovereign bond spreads. The model contains quarterly data for eleven euro area Member States: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, between 1999Q1 
and 2012Q3. The dependent variable is the sovereign bond spread, defined relative to the corresponding interest rate 
swap. Variables used to represent investors’ assessments of country-specific sovereign credit risk are: government 
debt stock, change in the fiscal balance (both as a share of GDP), the current account balance and real GDP growth 
rate. The squared debt-to-GDP ratio is used to reflect non-linearities in the relationship between sovereign spreads 
and public debt-to-GDP ratio. In order to estimate the role of liquidity risk the bond-specific bid-ask spreads of the 
corresponding maturities are used as regressors. The VIX index is used to reflect changes in overall investor 
confidence in global financial markets. Lending to banks by the Eurosystem is included to capture the impact of 
financial system support on spreads. A time dummy for the financial crisis between 2008Q3 and the end of the 
sample is inserted, in interaction with the intercept and some of the explanatory variables in order to indicate a 
regime switch in risk determination. The first principal component of the eleven yield spreads is used to represent 
the common euro area risk factor. Alternatively, the news component of the European Policy Uncertainty index is 
included in order to estimate the share of sovereign risk premia that is common to all Member States and is at least 
partially based on non-fundamentals. The news component is a composite of articles that contain keywords 
published in ten large European newspapers and is not country-specific. Therefore the impact of the idiosyncratic 
country uncertainty remains in the estimated error.   
Methodology and results 
The panel regressions quantify the degree of divergence of market-observed bond spreads from the value justified 
by macroeconomic fundamentals and common variability. The approach follows Barrios et al (2009) and Di Cesare 
et al (2012). Various specifications of the model result in the optimal representation: 
titititititi
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where sub-indexes i=1,…,N and t=1,…,T stand for country and time. The equation is estimated by a panel estimator 
with fixed-effects and robust standard errors. 
The obtained coefficients are similar to the ones in Barrios et al (2009) whose sample ends in mid-2009. The 
introduction of the crisis interaction dummy improves the fit and demonstrates the change in the significance of 
public debt, fiscal balance and liquidity on the sovereign debt market since the beginning of the crisis. Specifically, 
from the crisis onwards, debt has a growing impact on spreads as it becomes bigger in relation to GDP. The change 
in the fiscal balance and the bond market liquidity has an impact on spreads only from the start of the crisis.    
Two alternative approaches are used to address the common risk factor in the spreads. Based on the methodology in 
Di Cesare et al. (2012) and IMF (2012) the first principal component of the spread is included as an independent 
variable in one of the regression specifications. It accounts for around 60 % of common spread variability and 
captures co-movement that might stem from within the set of countries or from a common outside factor. In an 
alternative regression specification, the news component of the European Policy Uncertainty index is used to reflect 
common changes in both fundamentals and uncertainty as reported in newspaper articles. Both of these measures 
improve the fit, capturing at least part of the increase in the importance of immeasurable uncertainty. Neither of 
these measures, however, can precisely calculate how much of the increase in sovereign bond risk premia is due to 
an increase in incalculable uncertainty.   
The regression results are given in the following table. 
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QUEST is employed to quantify the effects on 
economic activity of a decrease in risk premia that 
could follow a decrease of uncertainty related to 
the functioning of EMU and the ongoing 
adjustment processes in some Member States 
(Box II.3.2).  
The fall in uncertainty is modelled as a decrease 
in risk premia equal to the weighted average of 
the differences between market-based spreads and 
estimated spreads in vulnerable Member States. 
The differences are obtained from the fourth 
regression in the table of Box II.3.1, where 
sovereign risk premia are modelled as a function 
of fundamental variables, market liquidity, 
systemic risk and a country’s potential support for 
banks and where shifts in coefficients during the 
crisis are accounted for. The resulting size of the 
risk premia shock is 177 basis points. 
The direct macroeconomic effects of changes in 
sovereign risk premia are quite small in the 
model. A higher risk premium on sovereign debt 
only affects new and rolled-over debt, and thus 
the average interest rate that governments pay is 
only increased incrementally. Therefore, the 
model predicts relatively small changes to public 
spending and no material impact on general 
economic activity. 
Box (continued) 
 
Model with 
economic 
fundamentals 
only
Model with debt 
dynamics 
Model with 
liquidity and 
systemic risk 
Model with 
crisis regime 
Model with 
crisis regime 
and common 
euro area factor
Model with 
crisis regime 
and news index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.089*** -0.137*** -0.041* 0.014* 0.007 0.013*
(4.44) (-3.34) (-1.74) (1.78) (0.62) (1.43)
-0.089*** -0.077*** -0.083***
(-10.04) (-6.44) (-9.52)
0.002*** 0.001***
(5.18) (3.16)
0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(14.14) (5.92) -11.15
-0.024*** -0.022*** -0.023***
(-3.55) (-3.26) (-3.31)
0.052* 0.068
(1.54) (1.18)
-0.199*** -0.14*** -0.125** -0.133*** -0.116** -0.120**
(-1.91) (-2.86) (-2.63) (-2.70) (-2.33) (-2.53)
0.110***
(8.03)
0.103*** 0.097*** 0.101***
(11.75) (8.5) (10.63)
0.08*
(1.65)
0.215*** 0.169*** 0.195***
(4.61) (4.93) (4.83)
0.219***
(2.82)
0.473**
(1.84)
1.311** 1.18** 1.190*
(2.47) (2.3) (2.37)
-5.555 2.047 0.031 -0.786 -0.14 -0.88
(-4.33) (1.37) (0.971) (-1.24) (-0.16) (-1.44)
R² 0.22 0.34 0.65 0.77 0.80 0.79
No obs 604 604 604 604 604 604
Const
Crisis dummy
News index
Common euro area factor
Post-crisis official lending to banks
VIX
Bid-ask spread*Crisis
Current acct balance
∆GDP
Bid-ask spread
Debt²*Crisis
∆Fiscal*Crisis
Debt²
Debt
Debt*Crisis
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Box II.3.2: The macroeconomic impact of falling sovereign bond spreads in the euro area
The macroeconomic impact of falling sovereign bond spreads is found using QUEST, a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model developed by the European Commission which incorporates various real, nominal and 
financial frictions. First, it is acknowledged that lower sovereign borrowing costs are likely to spill over to financing 
costs in the private sector. The spillover effect is calculated by comparing the evolution of sovereign and corporate 
CDS for euro area non-financial companies. Both series are found to display substantial comovement, particularly in 
countries that face fiscal strain. A median spillover coefficient of 0.6 is obtained by running a number of regressions 
of corporate CDS spreads on sovereign CDS spreads, controlling for changes in sector-specific risks. 
The analysis was carried out for all euro area companies having with liquid CDS quotes. However, given the 
relatively short sample with observations only covering the period since the crisis intensified in 2010, a spillover 
coefficient of 0.6 may well be overvalued. Moreover, spillovers from sovereign to private debt markets might be 
reinforced in a positive spiral when governments are made to pay more because a negative growth outlook is caused 
by tighter private-sector credit conditions. A spillover coefficient of 0.5 has therefore been chosen as the baseline 
scenario.   
Simulations of the QUEST model give the macroeconomic impact of decreasing sovereign risk premia. In this 
analysis a three-region variant of the model divides the euro area into core and vulnerable countries and includes the 
rest of the world. (1) The model introduces a number of risk premia on various assets that may reflect generalised 
risk perceptions, such as the risk perceptions of a country (sovereign risk) and sectoral risk premia (e.g. a risk 
premium on housing or corporate investment). A scenario in which sovereign bond spreads that are temporarily 
above their fundamental-based value revert to the fundamentals can then be modelled as a fall in the sovereign risk 
premium. These are then likely to spill over into the corporate sector as decreasing sectoral risk premia. 
In all the scenarios considered in this box it is assumed that the sovereign risk premia in the periphery are reduced 
permanently by 1.77 percentage points (the weighted average of the differences between market and model-based 
yields for vulnerable countries in the euro area in 2012Q3). In the baseline scenario this reduction is accompanied 
by a 0.5 spillover coefficient to risk premia in the housing, traded goods and services (non-traded goods) sectors. As 
a sensitivity analysis, higher (0.6) and lower (0.4) spillover factors are also considered. The higher factor is closer to 
the estimate obtained from regressing sovereign on corporate CDS spreads.    
As can be seen in the graph below, a risk premium reduction in the baseline scenario (a spillover coefficient of 0.5) 
leads to an immediate increase of 0.5 percentage points (pp) in the periphery’s output. Output continues to rise over 
the next years, reaching a 2.5 pp increase after 15 years. However, the size of the effect is highly sensitive to the 
spillover coefficient. For a stronger spillover of 0.6, the output may increase by more than 0.6 pp following the 
shock and is almost 3 pp higher than a constant-spread scenario after 15 years. Smaller spillovers from the 
government to corporate sector borrowing costs lead to smaller output effects. The impact of eliminating the 
spillover entirely is only 10 % of the impact when a spillover is included. 
            
While a reduction in spreads in the periphery has positive output effects for the more vulnerable euro area Member 
States, it is initially accompanied by a marginal output loss in the euro area core countries. This could happen as 
falling financing costs in the periphery create an investment opportunity for the rest of the world, including the core 
                                                          
(1) For the purposes of the empirical analysis in this section, euro area Member States are divided into two groups: core countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands) and more vulnerable countries: (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain).  
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However, there are several ways through which 
drops in uncertainty and sovereign risk premia 
may have more sizeable macroeconomic effects if 
they spill over to risk premia in the private sector. 
Since uncertainty increases the value of waiting 
for new information (higher physical adjustment 
frictions), firms respond to a drop in uncertainty 
by resuming investment. (67) Financial frictions 
also play a role. Gilchrist et al. (2009) argue that 
decreases in firm risk, for example, after the fall 
in uncertainty, would lead to a drop in the cost of 
capital, which in turn would release previously 
postponed investment activity and hiring 
decisions. (68) Finally, a fall in uncertainty may 
also affect households by supporting spending on 
durable goods and housing. 
In the baseline scenario presented in Box II.3.2, 
the reduction in the sovereign risk premium is 
allowed to spill over to the corporate sector, as 
reflected in decreasing corporate risk premia. (69) 
A 50% spillover to risk premia in the housing 
                                                        
(67) See Bernanke, B. (1983): Irreversibility, Uncertainty and 
Cyclical Investment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 98; Bloom, N. (2009): The Impact of Uncertainty 
Shocks, Econometrica, Vol. 77; Bachmann, R., S. Elstner and 
E. Sims (2011): Uncertainty and Economic Activity: 
Evidence from Business Survey Data, NBER Working Paper 
No 16143; and Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994): Investment 
Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press. . 
(68) Gilchrist, S., V. Yankov and E. Zakrajsek (2009): Credit 
Market Shocks and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from 
Corporate Bond and Stock Markets, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 56, No 4. 
(69) Many studies examine the dynamics of sovereign debt crises 
and the channels of transmission from sovereigns to firm’s 
costs of financing, showing that episodes of intense fiscal and 
sovereign debt pressure are associated with a significant 
widening of corporate bond spreads; see Dailami, M. (2012): 
Looking beyond the Euro Area Sovereign Bond Crisis, World 
Bank Economic Premise, No 76; Gilchrist, S., V. Yankov and 
E. Zakrajsek (2009): Credit Market Shocks and Economic 
Fluctuations: Evidence from Corporate Bond and Stock 
Markets, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 56, No 4; and 
Pastor, L., P. Veronesi (2012): Uncertainty about 
Government Policy and Stock Prices, Journal of Finance, No 
67, Vol. 4.  
market and the markets for traded goods and 
services is assumed. This is roughly in line with 
regressions of corporate CDS spreads on 
sovereign CDS spreads which point to a spillover 
effect from the sovereign to the corporate sector 
of about 60%. 
The results imply that a reduction in uncertainty 
does indeed have prolonged positive effects on 
economic activity and that it triggers a persistent 
rise in aggregate employment and consumption. 
In order to grasp the intuition behind the real 
impact sensitivity, it is crucial to notice that a 
reduction in risk premia in the corporate sector 
implies a decrease in the cost of capital for firms. 
In effect, corporate investment increases. This has 
a twofold effect on the aggregate output. Higher 
demand for goods and services increases output 
directly. Moreover, the build-up of corporate 
capital raises the production capacity of the 
economy. 
These findings are in line with the existing 
literature, showing that a negative shock to 
sovereign spreads affects economic activity 
positively. They suggest that, in order to bring 
sovereign spreads down, policies aimed at 
improving government macroeconomic 
fundamentals through fiscal consolidation need to 
be complemented with policies to reduce the 
general level of uncertainty. 
Concluding remarks 
This section has analysed recent developments in 
sovereign bond risk premia in the euro area in the 
light of a distinction between risk, which can be 
calculated, and uncertainty, which cannot. Even if 
macroeconomic fundamentals linked to the 
perceived riskiness of sovereign issuers continue 
to explain an important part of government bond 
risk premia, the analysis reveals that investors' 
Box (continued) 
 
euro area countries. Hence, there could be an increased capital outflow from the core to the periphery, with 
temporary negative GDP effects in the former. Nevertheless, the overall effect for the euro area as a whole remains 
positive, with a simulated output gain within the euro area as a whole reaching between 0.5 and 1 pp. 
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risk behaviours have changed during the crisis. 
For example, investors now behave more 
cautiously with regard to certain macroeconomic 
fundamentals and they are more aware of implicit 
liabilities related to banks. Moreover, the results 
indicate that a significant part of the recent surge 
in sovereign spreads in some Member States 
cannot be fully justified by measurable risk 
factors. The unexplained part turns out to be 
related to common euro area risk factors and to a 
rise in policy-related uncertainty. 
Over the last two years, the elevated level of 
 economic policy uncertainty has had a negative 
impact on sovereign risk premia in some Member 
States. A reversal of this trend could have a 
significant positive effect on economic growth in 
the countries concerned. Ongoing efforts to create 
a deep and genuine EMU will be instrumental in 
this respect. A consistent implementation of 
structural reforms and fiscal plans by euro area 
Member States will also help to eliminate 
uncertainty regarding economic policies.   
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